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DOES THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR HAVE A DUTY
ALWAYS TO OBEY THE LAW?
Norwood P. Beveridge*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is taken for granted that the corporate board of directors has a
duty to adopt and enforce policies and procedures regarding institu-
tional compliance with law.' Indeed, after the promulgation of the
new Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations, which substan-
tially reduce fines for corporations having an effective program to pre-
vent and detect violations of law, it would be a rare corporation of any
size without such a program.2 With respect to law compliance by the
director himself, the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance says that, with very limited exceptions, a director who
knowingly causes the corporation to disobey the law violates his duty
of care.3
* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. A.B., LL.B., Harvard Univer-
sity; LL.M., New York University School of Law. Professor Beveridge is a former member of
the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law Departments and chief legal of-
ficer of a New York Stock Exchange-listed manufacturing corporation. This Article was made
possible by a research grant from the Kerr Foundation at Oklahoma City University. The author
gratefully acknowledges the constructive criticism of his colleagues on the faculty of the
Oklahoma City University School of Law.
1. Section of Business Law, A.B.A., Corporate Director's Guidebook-1994 Edition, 49 Bus.
LAW. 1243, 1249, 1251, 1267 (1994) (explaining that the support of the board of directors and the
Chief Executive Officer for compliance with law should be clearly evidenced in an effective code
of corporate conduct).
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (1994); see
also Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs As a Defense to Criminal
Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 607-08 (1995) (proposing
that an effective compliance program should be a defense to corporate criminal liability, not just
a mitigating factor); see generally Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate
and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAW. 617, 657-59 (1994) (explaining that the imple-
mented compliance program must generally be effective in preventing and detecting criminal
conduct).
3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.01(b)(1) cmt. g, 4.01 cmt. d (1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE]; see generally Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries
and the General Law Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413, 466-91 (1991) (discussing the direc-
tor's duty of law compliance under the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance).
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There is no question that the corporation itself is liable to criminal
prosecution and punishment for crimes committed by its managers
and agents; the United States Supreme Court long ago rejected the
nineteenth century doctrine that a corporation cannot have criminal
intent.4 While the corporation cannot be imprisoned, it can be fined,
and even "put to death" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
which allow imposition of a fine sufficient to divest the organization of
all of its net assets in an appropriate case.5 The responsible agents of
the corporation can also be prosecuted criminally, although it is un-
clear what degree of involvement is required for conviction.6
It is debatable what role the shareholders play, or should play, in
this situation. The conventional wisdom seems to be that the share-
holders may have the right to hold the board of directors liable if it
was the directors that caused the corporation to break the law.7 It is
not clear why the board of directors, alone of all the business persons
in the world, must bear personal liability to their employer if they do
not adhere strictly to the letter of the law. One would think that at
the least there would be some acknowledgment that there are degrees
of crime and wrong, as recognized in the law, for example, with re-
spect to suits on illegal contracts. 8 The ALI's Principles of Corporate
4. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,494-95 (1909) (stat-
ing that there is no "good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for and charged
with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred them"
with respect to certain types of crimes). Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the corpora-
tion may be convicted of a crime even if no one corporate agent intended the violation. See
Anthony Ragozino, Comment, Replacing the Collective Knowledge Doctrine with a Better The-
ory for Establishing Corporate Mens Rea: The Duty Stratification Approach, 24 Sw. U. L. REV.
423 (1995) (criticizing the doctrine as inequitable); cf. SEWARD W. BRICE, A TREATISE ON THE
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIREs 367 (1880) (explaining that there is no corporate criminal liability
for felonies or misdemeanors requiring malice or willfulness); Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Mens Rea
and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability,
19 U. PI'r. L. REV. 21, 22-24 (1957) (describing the history of the notion that a corporation
cannot incur criminal liability).
5. See Edward Felsenthal, Corporate Death Sentence, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1994, at B6 (re-
porting that a federal court judge ordered American Precision Components, Inc. of Farmingdale,
N.Y. to go out of business permanently following a criminal conviction); UNITED STATES SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION, supra note 2, § 8C1.1 (making penalty applicable to organizations oper-
ated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means).
6. See generally 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY ch. 5 (1992) (dis-
cussing the attribution of criminal conduct to corporate officers, managers, and supervisors).
7. Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351
(Sup. Ct. 1909) for the proposition that even though committed to benefit the corporation, illegal
acts may amount to a breach of fiduciary duty). The Miller case was dismissed on remand for
lack of personal jurisdiction over any of the defendant directors. Miller, 394 F. Supp. 58, 61
(E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976).
8. See 17A AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 308 (1991) (stating that the "rule that courts will not
enforce illegal agreements is not absolute and is not without exceptions"); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 197-198 (1979) (stating that generally a party has no claim in restitution
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Governance rejects any cost-benefit justification for lawbreaking and,
by way of illustration, forbids a trucking corporation to instruct its
drivers to exceed the speed limit to improve corporate profits.9 Yet
the Board of the United Parcel Service of America, Inc. apparently
allowed its drivers in 1994 to run up over $1.5 million in parking tick-
ets in New York City alone.'0 Why are the directors not held liable
for this conduct?
The law of agency has never held an agent liable to his principal for
criminal behavior in the conduct of business where the principal knew
or had reason to know of the illegality." Also, a principal who gives
his agent money for a commercial bribe cannot necessarily enlist the
aid of the courts to recover the money even if the agent keeps it,12 nor
can he require the agent to account for the proceeds of an authorized
illegal act which is more than a minor offense. 13 Yet it is said that a
under an illegal contract unless denial would cause disproportionate forfeiture or the party
claiming restitution is excusably ignorant or not equally in the wrong).
9. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 2.01 cmt. g, illus. 10. The re-
cently repealed 1974 federally mandated 55 mph speed limit is a particularly poor choice as an
example of a law which should command undeviatingly strict compliance. See Quentin Hardy,
Westerners Rev Up to Speed Legally Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1995, at B1 (reporting that the
top speed of 85% of cars on the road is 64.1 mph, and 74.7 mph on Western rural roads).
10. Robert Frank, Forget Potholes, Potshots; Urban Scourge of Delivery-Truck Drivers Is "No
Parking," WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at B1. The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance do
allow a director to escape liability for violation of a penal statute which is chiefly intended to
raise tax revenues. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 7.19 cmt.
f, illus. 1 (citing a prohibition against the sale of colored margarine). Such conduct is not consid-
ered a "culpable" violation of law for purposes of the protection of a certificate of incorporation
provision limiting damages against a director except for, among other things, a "knowing and
culpable violation of law." Id. § 7.19(1). The Principles of Corporate Governance refers to such
a statutory violation as a "regulatory offense" that does not carry "significant criminal penal-
ties." Id. at cmt. f.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34 cmt. g (1958) (stating that if illegal conduct
is customary, consent of the principal is implied); cf id. § 411 cmt. c (stating that if both agent
and principal know of illegality, neither indemnifies the other); 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 556 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1886)
(explaining that a director's liability to the corporation for violation of statute is based on agency
law, which prohibits unauthorized acts).
12. See Stone v. Freeman, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (N.Y. 1948) (stating that courts should not "refe-
ree between thieves"); see also Smith v. Richmond, 70 S.W. 846, 849 (Ky. 1902) (explaining that
a partner cannot recover unpaid bribes from another partner who kept the money); E.H.
Schopler, Annotation, Recovery of Money or Property Entrusted to Another for Illegal Purposes,
but Not So Used, 8 A.L.R. 2D 307 (1949) (considering the question "whether, as a matter of
common law, money or property entrusted to another for an illegal purpose may be recovered
back as long as it has not been so used, either wholly or in part").
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 412(3) (1958); cf. id. § 412(2) (stating that an
agent must account unless a very serious crime is involved).
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shareholder who ratifies illegal conduct is still not barred from bring-
ing a derivative suit against the board of directors. 14
One need only glance at a newspaper to see that criminal wrongdo-
ing by corporations is commonplace. 15 In fact, it might be said that
there is no such thing as a corporation, or other business for that mat-
ter, in compliance with law; rather, there are only corporations (and
businesses) out of compliance with the law to varying degrees. De-
spite that fact, there are no modern cases holding directors liable to
shareholders for breaking the law.16 There may be reasons why direc-
tors are innocent of most corporate criminal behavior, 7 but obviously
there are times when they are not. Some explanation is needed for
the absence of decided cases supporting the conventional wisdom.
It is the thesis of this article that while the traditional business judg-
ment rule is not applied to shield directors from liability for inten-
tional violation of law, the same result is reached indirectly through
application of two other rules. The first rule is that a shareholder may
14. See W.S.R., Annotation, Laches as Affecting Right of Corporation or Its Stockholders to
Relief Against Directors for Violation of Trust, 10 A.L.R. 370 (1921) (explaining that it is well
settled that the right to relief against a director of a private corporation for breach of trust may
be barred by laches if not brought in a reasonable amount of time); cf Runcie v. Corn Exch.
Bank Trust Co., 6 N.Y.S.2d 616, 622 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (stating that shareholders cannot ratify
illegal acts which are ultra vires in character).
15. See Andy Pasztor, U.S. to Charge Litton Unit with Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1993, at
A3 (reporting that more than sixty-five defense firms and individuals have been convicted of
criminal conduct to date as a result of Operation Ill Wind); see also Statement of the Commission
Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Companies Affected by Government Defense Contract Pro-
curement Inquiry, 53 Fed. Reg. 29,226 (Aug. 3, 1988) (reminding companies of disclosure obliga-
tions in connection with defense contract procurement inquiry); ANDY PAszToR, WHmN THE
PENTAGON WAS FOR SALE (1995) (giving an account of Operation Ill Wind).
16. John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1173 (1977) (stating that there
do not appear to be any modem cases imposing liability for deliberate law violation).
17. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING 45 (1994) (explaining
that top managers have reason to be risk averse with respect to personal involvement in criminal
conduct since the benefits go to firm and the penalties to the individual). There are certainly
many instances where the board is not informed of criminal activity by subordinates who know
that such behavior would not be tolerated. See In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No.
31,554, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2939, at *49 (Dec. 3, 1992) (stating that supervisory personnel at Salo-
mon Brothers, Inc., who had knowledge of illegal activities of employee Paul W. Mozer, should
have considered reporting to the firm's Board of Directors that management was not taking
corrective action). There are also undoubtedly corporate soldiers who believe with Admiral
Poindexter that they are expected to engage in desired criminal activity without informing their
superiors so as to provide an alibi for those superiors against later discovery. Iran-Contra Inves-
tigation: Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transac-
tions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1987) (reporting the testimony of John M.
Poindexter where he announced, "I made a very deliberate decision not to ask the President so
that I could insulate him from the decision and provide some future deniability for the President
if it ever leaked out").
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not bring a derivative suit for a past violation of law unless the corpo-
ration has been damaged, the so-called "net-loss" rule.18 The second
rule is that in a shareholder's derivative action, a pre-suit demand
must generally be made on the board of directors, which may decide
not to sue a director for past violations of law, and even if demand is
excused, a special litigation committee of disinterested members of
the board has authority to decide not to maintain such a suit.19
After reviewing the case law on director liability for violations of
law and the net-loss rule,20 the article will examine the impact of statu-
tory provisions which prohibit insulating the director from, or indem-
nifying or insuring him against, such liability.21 Finally, the article will
examine two recent examples of corporate violation of law with a view
to applying the rules in practice.22
II. THE CASE LAW DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNING
Any discussion of the cases in this area must begin with the same
handful of New York cases, particularly Roth v. Robertson.23 In Roth,
the defendant Samuel L. Robertson was the majority shareholder 24
and manager of a family corporation, the S. L. Robertson Amusement
Company, which ran an amusement park with a roller coaster at Niag-
ara Falls.25 The three members of the Board of Directors included
Mr. Robertson, his brother, and his uncle.26 A large part of the com-
pany's business was conducted on Sunday, when tourists visited the
18. See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text (discussing the net-loss rule).
19. See infra notes 49-60, 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing requirements and limita-
tions on shareholder derivative suits).
20. See infra notes 23-90 and accompanying text (reviewing the case law on director liability
for violations of the law).
21. See infra notes 104-76 and accompanying text (examining the impact of statutory provi-
sions that deal with director liability).
22. See infra notes 177-306 and accompanying text (examining two recent examples of corpo-
rate violation of law).
23. 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909); see Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing
Roth for the proposition that even though committed to benefit the corporation, illegal acts may
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty); 3 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1021-1022 n.4 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1993 & Supp. 1995) (explaining
that a director is liable for ultra vires or illegal acts); 2 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & JOSEPH W.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON Ta LAW OF CORPORATIONS 945 n.52 and accompanying text
(3d ed. 1927) (citing Roth for the proposition that "there may be recovery for corporate moneys
unlawfully paid to silence complaint against the conduct of business in violation of the law");
Coffee, supra note 16, at 1167-68, 1173 n.274, 1192-94; Ryan, supra note 3, at 449-50; Christo-
pher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE
L.J. 1, 60 n.230 (1980) (describing Roth as a "relatively pure-and rare-expression of the in-
terventionist style").
24. Roth, 118 N.Y.S. at 354.
25. Id. at 352.
26. Id. at 354.
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Falls. 27 Threats were made by unspecified persons that unless money
was paid, steps would be taken to close the business on the Sabbath as
required by state law.28 After consulting with his co-director
Hofheins, who was also the company treasurer, Mr. Robertson paid
$800 to buy the complainants' silence.29 This payment was acquiesced
in by the directors and even by the plaintiff minority shareholder
Roth.30 The court held that the payment was blackmail, and since it
was not only ultra vires, that is, outside the powers of the corporation,
but also morally wrong, malum prohibitum or malum in se, the plain-
tiff was not estopped to challenge it. 3' The court ordered the defend-
ant Robertson to pay the sum of $800 back into the corporate
treasury. 32 Demand on the corporation as a precondition to bringing
this shareholder's derivative action was excused as unnecessary be-
cause Robertson controlled the corporation. 33
As discussed above,34 if the company had been a sole proprietorship
or partnership, the suit would have been dismissed. The stated reason
for a different decision in the case of a corporation was the then con-
trolling doctrine of ultra vires, which appeared "as a guiding, or rather
misleading principle in the legal system" in about the year 1845.3 5
The Sunday Blue Laws of New York were eventually declared un-
constitutional, not on the frequently urged grounds that they violated
the establishment of religion clause, but on grounds of vagueness and
lack of a rational connection between the legislative purpose and the
provisions of the statute, which contained many exceptions. 36 How-
ever, in 1909, the Roth court was quite correct in believing that the
defendant's operations violated the New York statute.37 The court
also was correct in holding that, based on the prevailing doctrine at
27. Id. at 352.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 353-54.
31. Id. at 352-53.
32. Id. at 354.
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing the role of agency law in deter-
mining liability).
35. See BRICE, supra note 4, at vii, ix-x ("The doctrine of ultra vires is constantly cropping up
in unexpected quarters, and manifesting its effects in an unforeseen and unwelcome manner.");
see generally HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 240-69 (rev. ed.
1946) (discussing the "evils, quibbles and uncertainties of the pathological, ill-founded decisions
on ultra vires").
36. People v. Abrahams, 353 N.E.2d 574, 579 (N.Y. 1976) (declaring the Sunday Blue Laws of
New York unconstitutional).
37. See United Vaudeville Co. v. Zeller, 108 N.Y.S. 789 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (holding that movie
theater violates statute); People v. Poole, 89 N.Y.S. 773 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (holding that baseball
game violates statute).
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that time, the plaintiff shareholder could not estop himself from suit,
since while shareholders might generally ratify actions voidable as ul-
tra vires,38 even all of the shareholders together could not ratify an act
made illegal by statute.39 At the turn of the century, it is conceivable
that the corporation might have lost its charter for violation of the
Sabbath laws.40
There are at least three very troublesome aspects to the Roth deci-
sion. The first aspect is the statute itself, a prohibition taken from the
Old Testament with a history of governmental enforcement spanning
sixteen centuries as far back as the Roman Emperor Constantine in
321 A.D.41 Criminalizing roller coaster rides on a Sunday afternoon
smacks of questionable state interference with civil liberties and estab-
lishment of religion, even allowing for a possible difference in atti-
tudes at the turn of the century. It is exactly the sort of law that seems
bound to invite evasion and avoidance, corruption of public authori-
ties and inconsistent enforcement. 42 The amusement park was, after
all, operated openly in full view of the authorities, not the sort of clan-
destine activity usually made the subject of important criminal
statutes.
The second problematic aspect of the Roth case is the plaintiff's
unclean hands, which should have barred him from any relief in a
court of equity. When it suited his convenience, the plaintiff approved
and ratified the payment; then he changed his mind, apparently be-
cause of some falling out between him and the majority shareholder
on unrelated matters referenced in the decision. The defendant Rob-
ertson concededly acted for the benefit of the corporation after con-
38. Wormser v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 76 N.E. 1036, 1038 (N.Y. 1906); Holmes v. Willard, 25
N.E. 1083, 1083-84 (N.Y. 1890); Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879).
39. Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (N.Y. 1912) (citing Kent v. Quicksilver
Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879)).
40. Cf State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club, 154 S.W. 1151 (Tenn. 1913) (reversing
chancellor's decree dissolving the Club for violating the Sabbath by playing baseball because the
Sabbath statute was not passed on three readings on three days in the state Senate as required by
the state constitution). A corporation can still be judicially dissolved for illegal conduct. See
People v. Oliver Sch., Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming dissolution of
corporation under New York statute which allows for dissolution on various grounds, including
the "persistently fraudulent or illegal" conduct of business).
41. People v. Abrahams, 353 N.E.2d 574, 575 (N.Y. 1976) ("As a precept of civil government,
however, the Sunday laws are over 16 centuries old having been originated by the Roman Em-
peror Constantine in 321 AD who ordered all Judges and inhabitants of cities to rest on
Sunday.").
42. The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance cites a Sunday Blue Law which has not
been enforced for many years, does not have community support, and is ignored by many retail
businesses as the type of law that can legitimately be violated without departing from the norm




sultation with, and the approval of, his fellow directors. As expressed
a century ago, the doctrine of ultra vires had become "a species of
Frankenstein" which rode roughshod over all accepted doctrines of
law and equity, including the doctrine of unclean hands.43
The third problem with the Roth case is the lack of harm to the
corporation, which apparently benefitted from the payment and, as a
result of the decision, was allowed to keep the benefit while not bear-
ing any of the expense. From a moral perspective, the decision
changed nothing except that the court made the majority shareholder
bear the expense alone, while the supposedly objecting minority
shareholder kept his pro rata share of the profits, enhanced by the
lack of related expense. Insofar as the decision allows suit in the ab-
sence of injury to the corporation, it cannot be regarded as currently
authoritative in light of subsequent cases adopting the New York "net-
loss" rule.44
Roth was distinguished in a later New York case, Hornstein v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc.45 In Hornstein, the plaintiff shareholders brought
a derivative suit on behalf of Paramount Pictures, Inc. to compel its
directors and officers to repay $100,000 in bribes paid to two labor
union officials who threatened to call a strike.46 The New York Court
of Appeals held that the victim of labor organization extortion does
not violate the criminal law by paying the bribe.47 The trial court dis-
tinguished Roth on the ground that the corporation in Roth operated
in violation of the law.48
Roth also has not survived the advent of the special litigation com-
mittee in New York. In the famous case of Auerbach v. Bennett,49 the
directors and auditors of General Telephone & Electronics Corpora-
tion were sued in a shareholder's derivative action to recover more
43. BRICE, supra note 4, at ix-x. Roth was distinguished in Diamond v. Diamond, 107
N.Y.S.2d 508, 523 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 121 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Div. 1953), modified, 120
N.E.2d 819 (N.Y. 1954) (which held that 50% shareholder cannot sue other 50% shareholder
where both consented), on the grounds that in Roth there were other shareholders involved that
were innocent; however, that fact does not appear in the Roth opinion.
44. See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text (discussing the net-loss rule).
45. 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1943), appeal denied, 43
N.Y.S.2d 751 (App. Div. 1943), aff'd, 55 N.E.2d 740 (N.Y. 1944) (per curiam).
46. Id. at 407.
47. 55 N.E.2d at 742.
48. Hornstein, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14; accord In re Vaniman Int'l, Inc., 22 B.R. 166, 189-91
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding that the defendant directors were not liable for payment of $35,000
commercial bribe to procure $220,000 profit). The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance
does not agree. See PRmNCIPLEs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 2.01, illus. 7
(stating that the payment of solicited commercial bribe to obtain a contract is a violation of the
principle of obedience to the law).
49. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
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than $11 million paid in bribes and kickbacks to public officials and
political parties in foreign countries.50 These payments had been
made with the knowledge and personal involvement of at least four
members of the corporation's Board of Directors, according to a re-
port filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by the
board's audit committee.51 The audit committee of the board of direc-
tors had conducted an investigation with the assistance of a special
independent counsel and Arthur Andersen & Co., the corporation's
outside auditors.5 2
After the commencement of the derivative action, the Board cre-
ated a special litigation committee comprised of three newly ap-
pointed disinterested directors, which determined that the asserted
claims lacked merit and that it would not be in the best interests of the
corporation for the action to proceed.5 3 A unanimous panel of the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the decision
of the special litigation committee could not foreclose a suit challeng-
ing acts of officers and directors which offended public policy, citing
Roth v. Robertson.54 The New York Court of Appeals reversed this
decision and dismissed the complaint, holding that the decision of the
special litigation committee, composed of disinterested directors,
reached after a full inquiry and deliberation, was entitled to the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule.55
At least one commentator has suggested that the New York Court
of Appeals would decide Auerbach differently today, in light of devel-
50. Id. at 996-97; see also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (holding that federal courts will
generally defer to state law on effect to be given decision of special litigation committee); Abbey
v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980)
(dismissing derivative suit charging violations of criminal law in connection with corporation's
guilty plea and $1.4 million in penalties; decision of independent board committee entitled to
business judgment rule protection under pre-Zapata Delaware law); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 508, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that if committee is proved to be independent, decision
not to sue for recovery of $59 million in illegal bribes and political payments made to Italian
political parties and others is protected by business judgment rule under New Jersey law).
51. Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 996-97.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 997.
54. 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (App. Div. 1978), modified, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
55. Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1002-1004; see also In re General Tire and Rubber Co. Sec. Litig.,
726 F.2d 1075, 1080-82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) (stating that independent
committee decision not to pursue remedies for improper and illegal conduct was entitled to
respect under Ohio law; settlement of shareholder suits approved); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d
778, 780-83 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (applying Burks and Auerbach to
give effect to special litigation committee decision under California law to dismiss derivative suit
regarding new stock option plan); General Elec. Co. v. Rowe, No. 89-7644 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15036 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1992) (dismissing shareholder derivative suit, charging damages
based on criminal conviction of the company under False Claims Act resulting in $10 million
fines on basis of special litigation committee decision).
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opments in the law such as the Supreme Court of Delaware's decision
to allow the court to use its own business judgment in deciding
whether to dismiss a derivative suit at the request of a special litiga-
tion committee. 56 Nonetheless, the New York Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed the Auerbach decision two years later,57 and the Delaware
Supreme Court brought its position closer to Auerbach four years
later by holding that the court need not, but may, exercise its own
business judgment.5 8 Few courts have found it desirable to exercise
their own business judgment after going through the first step of the
Delaware procedure of finding committee independence and proper
inquiry.59 Even where a court has exercised its own contrary judg-
ment, it has done so because of doubts as to committee independence
and proper inquiry, so that the two steps tend to collapse into one.6°
56. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981); see Ryan, supra note 3, at 461
n.191 (noting that New York was the earliest of the state law trilogy of special litigation commit-
tee cases, which included the highest courts of New York, Delaware, and North Carolina).
57. See Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 425 N.E.2d 820, 822 (N.Y.), reh'g denied, 427
N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1981) (dismissing shareholder's derivative suit charging illegal domestic
bribes and political contributions on the grounds of res judicata); see also Cramer v. General Tel.
& Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) (dismissing share-
holder's action asserting that same actions violated state and federal law).
58. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985). Contra Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323.
328 (N.C. 1987) (holding that the court must exercise its own business judgment). The North
Carolina Supreme Court had some difficulty in reaching this decision since it had just reached
the opposite conclusion one year earlier. Alford v. Shaw, 349 S.E.2d 41, 56 (N.C. 1986), with-
drawn after reh'g, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987) (adopting Auerbach position); cf Houle v. Low,
556 N.E.2d 51, 59 (Mass. 1990) (stating that independent committee decision if properly reached
should be respected unless "contrary to the great weight of evidence"); see generally Charles W.
Murdock, Corporate Governance-The Role of Special Litigation Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV.
79, 89-96 (1993) (analyzing judicial approaches to special litigation committees); Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Propriety of Termination of Properly Initiated Derivative Action by "Independent
Committee" Appointed by Board of Directors Whose Actions (Or Inaction) Are Under Attack, 22
A.L.R. 4TH 1206 (1983) (discussing various state and federal cases which have considered "the
propriety of the termination of a derivative suit by the board of directors of a corporation pursu-
ant to a decision by a committee ... that further prosecution of the suit was not in the best
interests of the corporation").
59. See R. FRANKLIN BALOT-I & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND BusnESS OROANIZATIONS § 13.8 (1994) (explaining judicial deference in corporate
arenas).
60. See Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the commit-
tee's decision, expressing doubts as to committee independence, good faith and proper evalua-
tion of evidence); Johnson v. Hui, 811 F. Supp. 479, 490 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding no basis under
Delaware law for the court's taking the "extraordinary step" of substituting its own business
judgment for that of the committee); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 966 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal
denied, 504 A.2d 571 (Del. 1986) (questioning certain committee members' independence); cf.
Davidowitz v. Edelman, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff'd, 612 N.Y.S.2d 882 (App.
Div. 1994) (applying New York law to reject committee recommendation for lack of committee
independence and lack of a "thorough and reasonable inquiry").
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Another New York case frequently discussed in this area is Abrams
v. Allen.61 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had charged
Remington Rand, Inc. with refusal to bargain and other unfair labor
practices in connection with a May 1935 strike at its New York facili-
ties; the federal courts had issued an order in 1938 enforcing a prior
NLRB order to cease and desist from such practices. 62 As a result,
shareholders brought suit against the directors and officers of the
company, charging that during the years 1934-1937, management dis-
mantled corporate plants and curtailed production for the sole pur-
pose of punishing striking employees and not for any legitimate
business purpose.63 The Supreme Court, Appellate Division had dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.64 The court
stated that the National Labor Relations Act had only become effec-
tive on July 5, 1935, and management therefore had the right to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of this new legislation, which was not
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court until April of 1937.65
James H. Rand, Jr., Remington's president, deliberately invited a judi-
cial test of the requirement of bargaining with the union and consist-
ently followed that course of action. 66
New York's highest court reversed the dismissal in a four-to-three
decision, stating that the directors' actions might "fall into one or
more of the categories of acts for which directors are liable" to the
corporation.67 The categories enunciated were: (1) lack of due care;
(2) waste of corporate assets; (3) willful conversion or misapplication
of the company's goods; and (4) using the corporation's property for
61. 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y.), reh'g denied, 75 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1947). For a discussion of
Abrams, see Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE, supra note 3, § 4.01 cmt. d; Coffee, supra note 16, at 1190-92; Ryan, supra note 3, at
450.
62. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 864-66, 874-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 576, and cert. denied, 304 U.S. 585 (1938); see M. L. Cross, Annotation, Lockout or Removal
of Place of Employment to Avoid Labor Difficulties or Punish Employees as Actionable Wrong,
173 A.L.R. 674 (1948) (discussing Abrams v. Allen and officers and directors of a corporation's
liability for damages for mismanagement of the corporation).
63. Abrams, 74 N.E.2d at 306.
64. 65 N.Y.S.2d 421 (App. Div. 1946) (per curiam), rev'd, 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1947). An
earlier complaint challenging the same action had been upheld in Leech v. Fuller, 19 N.Y.S.2d 98
(Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 20 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. Div.), leave to appeal denied, 20 N.Y.S.2d 666
(App. Div. 1940), presumably by a different panel of the Appellate Division.
65. 65 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
66. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d at 868. The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance states
explicitly that causing the corporation to disobey the law openly in order to test the validity or
interpretation of a law would not be considered a violation of the corporation's duty of obedi-
ence to law or the director's duty of care. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
3, § 2.01 cmt. g, § 4.01 cmt. d.
67. Abrams, 74 N.E.2d at 306.
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the doing of an unlawful or immoral act (citing several ultra vires deci-
sions).68 At trial, the plaintiffs apparently presented their case based
solely on a lack of due care taken by the directors; thereafter, the
court dismissed the complaint, holding that the directors' actions were
entitled to protection under the business judgment rule.69
If anything, then, Abrams stands for the proposition that directors
are not automatically liable for breaking the law, since the corporation
in the case unquestionably broke the law with the knowledge of the
Board. The Abrams case, like the Roth case, was relied upon by the
Supreme Court, Appellate Division in Auerbach,70 where it held that
a special litigation committee could not dismiss a plaintiff share-
holder's complaint charging unlawful bribes. This decision, one will
recall, was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals; 71 therefore,
the Abrams doctrine must be considered subservient to the power of
the special litigation committee.
Even where the directors have caused the corporation to break the
antitrust laws, resulting in a criminal conviction of the corporation and
its directors, they are still not liable in a shareholder's derivative ac-
tion for damage to the corporation where they did not know or have
reason to know that their actions were unlawful.72 Particularly where
the directors have relied on the opinion of counsel as to the legality of
a course of action, they are not liable for resulting damage to the cor-
68. Id. at 306-07 (citing the following three ultra vires cases: Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155
N.E. 58, 59-61 (N.Y. 1926), reh'g denied, 155 N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1927) (refusing to find a parent
liable for tort of subsidiary; alleged implied assignment of street railroad franchise from subsidi-
ary to parent without state commission approval would be a criminal act, could not be ratified by
shareholders, and will not be inferred); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138, 140-42
(N.Y. 1912) (holding that the plaintiff need not make demand on shareholders before bringing
action to challenge issuance of $1.5 million of corporation's capital stock for grossly inadequate
consideration and shareholders cannot ratify fraudulent or unlawful action of the board); Bath
Gaslight Co. v. Claffy, 45 N.E. 390, 390-93 (N.Y. 1896) (holding that the lease of all its properties
by gas corporation was ultra vires since made without legislative sanction, but plaintiff may re-
cover against lessee and its sureties for rent during lessee's occupation of the premises since
lease, while illegal and void involves no moral turpitude).
69. 113 N.Y.S.2d 181, 185, 190 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
70. Auerbach v. Bennett, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (App. Div. 1978), modified, 393 N.E.2d 994
(N.Y. 1979); see supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text (discussing Auerbach in full).
71. 393 N.E.2d at 994.
72. See Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272-73 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 47
N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Div. 1944) (holding that directors were not liable for damages unless it can
be shown that they acted "fraudulently, negligently, corruptly or in bad faith"); S. Samuel Arsht,
The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 93, 129-30 (1979) (explaining that the
presumption against liability does not apply where actions "clearly contrary to law"); Harlan M.
Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 143, 177 (1961)
(arguing that director liability should be confined to situations where "there is no reasonable
doubt as to the illegality of a proposed course of conduct").
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poration unless their reliance was unreasonable. 73 There does not
seem to be any question, however, that directors are and should be
liable where they knowingly and unreasonably violate the law and
cause damage to the corporation as a result.74
The third case in the asserted lineup of New York cases supporting
the conventional wisdom 75 is actually a federal court decision purport-
edly applying New York law, Miller v. AT&T.76 The Miller case was a
73. See Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 848 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that even had there
been a violation of law, the case must be remanded to determine directors' liability, if any at all);
Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 246-48 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that the officer of a corporation is
not liable for injury to the corporation because the officer reasonably relied on the advice of
legal counsel); see generally Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of
Counsel as Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1 (1976) (discussing the
evolution and boundaries of the reliance doctrine).
74. See Hill v. Murphy, 98 N.E. 781, 781-83 (Mass. 1912) (holding that judgment creditor of
corporation entitled to enforce directors' liability to corporation for damages sustained by the
corporation where directors maliciously and for personal reasons libeled plaintiff in the name of
the corporation); see also Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1283-85 (10th Cir. 1969)
(holding that corporation may recover amount of fine for antitrust violation against former em-
ployee whose misconduct caused the violation); Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 293 N.Y.S. 912, 917
(App. Div.), aff'd, 12 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y.), reh'g denied, 12 N.E.2d 601 (N.Y. 1937) (holding direc-
tors liable to corporation for loss caused by unlawful contract in which they had a personal
interest); Knopfler v. Bohen, 225 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (App. Div. 1962) (determining complaint
sufficient and demand excused where directors alleged to have damaged corporation by violating
federal antitrust laws); Elizabeth T. Tsai, Annotation, Right of Corporation to Indemnity for
Civil or Criminal Liability Incurred by Employee's Violation of Antitrust Laws, 37 A.L.R. 3D
1355, 1357 (1971) (discussing Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle in the context of the rule that right to
indemnity depends on the employee's breach of fiduciary duty). However, it has been held that
illegal acts directed at third parties, intended to benefit the corporation but the discovery of
which instead causes damage to the corporation, do not give rise to a derivative shareholder's
cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act due to a
lack of proximate cause. Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, 40 F.3d 182 (7th Cir. 1994); In re American
Express Co. Shareholder Litig., 39 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Teledyne Defense Contracting
Derivative Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1369 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
75. For sources discussing the Third Circuit's holding in Miller that a plaintiff in a shareholder
derivative action must prove the elements of the statutory violation as part of her claim, see
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 401 cmt. d; Coffee, supra note 16, at
1192-94; Ryan, supra note 3, at 451.
76. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). AT&T was also sued in a shareholder's derivative action in
federal court in New York for making a $50,000 contribution in support of a proposed New York
state public transportation bond issue to be submitted for a referendum vote, allegedly in viola-
tion of state law prohibiting corporate payments for "political purposes." Schwartz v. Romnes,
495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). The court dismissed the suit, saying that a non-partisan referendum
was not a political purpose within the meaning of the statute, nor was the contribution in viola-
tion of the New York Public Service Law or otherwise ultra vires. Id. at 853-54; see also Marsili
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the political
contribution of $10,000 made by public utility to defeat nonpartisan initiative proposal was not
ultra vires, gift or waste of corporate assets nor contrary to state public policy); Kristine C.
Kamezis, Annotation, Power of Corporation to Make Political Contribution or Expenditure
Under State Law, 79 A.L.R. 3D 491 (1977) (discussing the power of a corporation to make a
political contribution under the corporation's own charter, general corporation laws, or state
statutes); cf. Stern v. General Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 23 F.3d 746
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shareholder's derivative action brought against the directors of AT&T
alleging that the Board refused to take action to collect a debt of
about $1,500,000 for telephone and other communication services ren-
dered to the Democratic National Committee during the 1968 Demo-
cratic National Convention.77 The district court, noting that over
$250,000 had been paid on the account since the commencement of
the suit, applied the business judgment rule and dismissed the action
for failure to state a claim.78 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded the lower court's decision, citing both Roth and
Abrams 79 for the proposition that the business judgment rule could
not insulate the directors from their alleged contribution to the Dem-
ocratic National Committee in violation of a federal prohibition on
corporate campaign spending.80
On remand, the district court dismissed the action for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over any of the defendant directors, and the Third
Circuit affirmed without opinion.81 Since the Miller court purportedly
applied New York law and followed Roth and Abrams, the case does
not add anything to the force of those two decisions; however, in
Miller, the allegedly illegal conduct had not yet been completed when
the plaintiff filed suit for damages, since the debt could still be
collected.
In Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp.,82 the same
court that decided Miller dismissed a shareholder's derivative action
alleging fraud on the part of the corporation in the purchase and sale
(2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 293 (1994) (finding no waste of corporate assets in
corporate expenditures for political action committee).
77. Miller, 507 F.2d at 761.
78. 364 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
79. Miller, 507 F.2d at 762-63.
80. Id. at 763. The United States Supreme Court later held that corporate shareholders were
not entitled to bring an implied cause of action under the statute. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975) (dismissing suit by shareholders of Bethlehem Steel based on a corporate advertising
campaign in connection with the 1972 Presidential election). However, the decision in Cort cited
Miller for the proposition that a remedy might be available under state law for breach of fiduci-
ary duty in addition to the doctrine of ultra vires. Id. at 72-74 & 74 n.6, 84.
It should be noted that the time between the District Court and the Court of Appeals deci-
sions in Miller was a time of unprecedented national upheaval. The Office of the Watergate
Special Prosecutor had uncovered evidence of use of corporate funds for illegal domestic polit-
ical contributions, which had caused the Securities and Exchange Commission to publish a state-
ment concerning disclosure of such payments in documents filed with the Commission.
Disclosures Relating to the Making of Illegal Campaign Contributions, Securities Act Rel. No.
5466 [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,669, at 83,873 (Mar. 8, 1974).
Richard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States on August 8, 1974. The Court of
Appeals could not have been unaffected by these momentous developments.
81. 394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976).
82. 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
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of securities.8 3 The suit was based on the GT&E Audit Committee
report that had been the subject of the New York state court action in
Auerbach v. Bennett.84 The court did not reach the question whether
the Special Litigation Committee's finding that the suit was not in the
best interests of the corporation would bar the action.85 However, the
court did dismiss the action for failure to comply with the requirement
that a demand must first be made on the Board of Directors in the
absence of adequate excuse.86 The court distinguished Miller on the
basis that the plaintiffs in that case alleged that the directors' decision
not to collect the debt was itself an illegal act.87 This same distinction
has been made in other suits, namely that the directors' decision not
to pursue corporate remedies for completed illegal action by other
directors is not in itself illegal, immoral or ultra vires; therefore, such
conduct does not amount to ratification of fraud.88
It should be further noted that the Miller court held that under New
York law, the plaintiff could not state a cause of action simply by al-
leging breach of a federal statute without also alleging that the breach
caused independent damage to the corporation.8 9 This aspect of the
problem is known as the "net loss" rule. 90
III. THE NEW YORK NET Loss RULE
The Miller court was quite right in holding that the New York cases
required proof of damage to the corporation to support a share-
holder's derivative action alleging violation of law by one or more di-
rectors. 91 This requirement was made clear in several lower court
New York decisions.92 The Miller court suggests that Runcie v. Bank-
83. Id. at 270-77.
84. Id. at 264-65. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text (explaining the factual and
procedural history of Auerbach v. Bennett).
85. Id. at 276.
86. Id. at 276-77.
87. Id. at 274.
88. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that a decision
not to bring suit for past illegal conduct is not itself a violation of law); cf. S. Solomont & Sons
Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 93 N.E.2d 241, 248 (Mass. 1950) (holding
that a pre-suit demand on the corporation is required even where the acts complained of are
ultra vires or otherwise illegal).
89. 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974).
90. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 7.18 cmt. e.
91. Miller, 507 F.2d at 763 n.5.
92. For decisions dismissing shareholders' derivative actions for failure to adequately plead
violation of the federal antitrust laws or injury to the corporation, see Diamond v. Davis, 31
N.Y.S.2d 582, 583-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941); Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1962); see also Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (dismissing
complaint since damages cannot be presumed merely from imposition of antitrust fine); P~iNci-
PLEs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 7.18 n.7 (citing several New York cases that
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ers Trust Co. 93 contradicts this rule, but Runcie holds only that direc-
tors cannot continue to violate a mandatory statute requiring fidelity
bonds on bank employees to be written by domestic insurance compa-
nies by asserting that it is cheaper to obtain such bonds from a foreign
underwriter such as Lloyd's of London.94 This case involved a contin-
uing illegal course of conduct rather than a completed one. In the
related case of Runcie v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co.,95 the court
held that since the bank had ceased to accept Lloyd's policies, an af-
firmative defense that the corporation had not only suffered no dam-
ages but had benefitted financially was sufficient in law and would not
be stricken in a suit for violation of the same statute.96
The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance suggests that the
decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond v.
Oreamuno97 cast doubt on the New York net loss rule.98 That is not at
all true. Diamond was a shareholder's derivative suit intended to hold
the chairman of the board and the president liable to the corporation
for losses they avoided by selling shares of the corporation's stock
based on undisclosed knowledge of a seventy-five percent decrease in
corporate earnings. 99 The court of appeals held that the complaint
stated a valid cause of action for recovery of the proceeds derived
from a misuse of confidential corporate information, even though the
corporation had not been injured.100 The court cited the Restatement
(Second) of Agency as authority.10 1 This case illustrates the general
rule that where an agent has profited from a breach of his fiduciary
required the plaintiff to prove that the damages from the illegal activity exceeded any profits); cf.
Citron v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 407 A.2d 1040, 1045 (Del. 1979) (finding that convic-
tions of perjury and willful filing of false SEC report are not grounds for forfeiture of compensa-
tion of chief executive officer and director where illegal actions benefitted the corporation).
93. 6 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1938); see Miller, 507 F.2d at 763 n.5 (distinguishing Runcie from
the New York rule that an alleged breach of a federal statute is insufficient to state a cause of
action absent independent damage to the corporation).
94. 6 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
95. 6 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
96. Id. at 621.
97. 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
98. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 7.18 cmt. e (discussing Dia-
mond's impact on the net-loss rule); see also Ryan, supra note 3, at 456 (arguing that the net-loss
rule may have been undermined by Diamond).
99. 248 N.E.2d at 911.
100. Id. at 912.
101. Id. at 914; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (1958) (explaining that
an agent who sells securities based on inside information holds the profits in constructive trust
for the principal).
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duty, injury to the principal is not required for recovery. 10 2 This rule
does not apply to the situation where the agent has not profited.
The Principles of Corporate Governance proposes to change the
net loss rule in three ways: (1) by prohibiting the court from offsetting
losses from one transaction against profits from other identical but
separate transactions; (2) by allowing the court to refuse to offset
profits that it finds contrary to public policy; and (3) by placing on the
defendant the burden of proving profits.'0 3 There is no justification
for any of these changes. The courts should have the authority to de-
cide in a particular case whether or not a corporation has suffered
damages as a result of an illegal course of conduct.
IV. STATE STATUTES LIMITING DIRECTOR LIABILITY TO
CORPORATION
In the aftermath of the controversial 1985 decision of the Delaware
Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom,1°4 many states revised their
corporation statutes to protect corporate directors against personal li-
ability to the corporation and its shareholders (and creditors, in some
instances) for violation of the duty of care.'0 5
Most of these new corporate statutes contain exceptions for certain
types of conduct for which a director is not immune from suit.10 6 For
example, the Delaware statute does not allow director immunity from
a suit for damages arising from, among other things, "acts or omis-
sions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
102. See id. § 389 cmt. c (stating that harm to principal is not required); see also Frigitemp
Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1975) (distinguishing Dia-
mond in suit where defendants were not fiduciaries); In re Symbol Technologies Sec. Litig., 762
F. Supp. 510, 517-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (explaining reasoning behind Diamond decision); Excel-
sior 57th Corp. v. Lerner, 553 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764-65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (citing Diamond for
proposition that damages to plaintiff are not required for disgorgement of proceeds of fiduciary
self-dealing and conflict of interest).
103. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 7.18(c), cmt. e.
104. See 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding directors personally liable for approving cashout
merger without adequate consideration).
105. See 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIREcroRS, ch. 16 (5th ed. 1993) (discussing state statutes). This concern for insulating
business managers from duty of care litigation has also been incorporated into statutes governing
other forms of business organizations, such as the partnership and the limited liability company,
in order to give greater protection to owners and managers. See UNr. LTD LIAR. Co. Act
§ 409(c) & (h) (NCCUSL Draft Mar. 8, 1995) (explaining that members and managers owe a
duty of care to refrain from "engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional mis-
conduct, or a knowing violation of law"); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Act § 404(c) (1994) (stating that
members of the partnership owe a duty of care to refrain from "engaging in grossly negligent or
reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law").
106. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105.
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knowing violation of law."' 1 7 The New York statute similarly contains
an exception to immunity for acts or omissions which were "in bad
faith or involved intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law."'1 08 These statutes do not distinguish between violations of civil
law, as by a breach of contract, and violations of criminal law,
although some state statutes do exclude only violations of criminal
law.10 9 The American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate
Laws, in its most recent formulation of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, provides an exclusion for "an intentional violation
of criminal law," and the Official Comment makes clear that "inten-
tional" means a specific intent to violate the criminal law. 11 0
Other statutory exclusions, as in California, have been phrased to
withhold immunity for "acts or omissions that involve intentional mis-
conduct or a knowing and culpable violation of law."1'' The Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance endorses this language, defining
"culpable" as "morally reprehensible under generally prevailing stan-
107. DEL. CODE Ar. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (Supp. 1994). The statute also excludes liability
for improper dividends or stock repurchases, breach of the duty of loyalty, or receipt of an
improper personal benefit. Id. § 102(b)(7). The Delaware Supreme Court recently construed
the statute to allow immunity from suit for breach of the fiduciary duty of candor in disclosing
material facts to shareholders in connection with a merger. Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1287 (Del. 1994) (en banc). The Arnold decision impliedly overrules the
contrary holding of Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783 (Del. 1993). See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY,
supra note 105, at 7 (explaining that the Zirn court held that the Delaware statute did not shield
the directors from liability for fraud). TWo of the justices on the Zirn court, Justices Moore and
Horsey, no longer sit on the Delaware Supreme Court. Richard B. Schitt, Delaware Supreme
Court Justice Could be Denied a Second Term, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994, at B10. For an expla-
nation of the Delaware statute, see E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a
Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399
(1987).
108. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
109. For statutes excluding violations of criminal law unless the director had reasonable cause
to believe his conduct was lawful or no reasonable cause to believe it was unlawful, see, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831(1)(b)(1) (West 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0828(1)(b) (West
1992). The analogous Virginia provision excludes "willful misconduct or a knowing violation of
the criminal law or of any federal or state securities law, including, without limitation, any claim
of unlawful insider trading or manipulation of the market for any security." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1993). This exception proved the undoing for the director defendants in
Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated, No. 91-1873(L),
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33286 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993) (holding directors liable for damages of
over $12.2 million for knowing violation of the securities law). The case was settled on March
12, 1993. Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Director Liability: Recent Developments, 47 CONSUMER
FIN. L. Q. REP. 220 (1993).
110. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 2.02(b)(4)(D), cmt. 3(i) (1990).
111. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)(A)(i) (West 1990) (emphasis added). The Connecticut
statute permits limitation of a director's liability to his compensation during the year in question,
except, among other things, for "knowing and culpable violation of law by the director." CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-290(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
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dards. 11 2 Under this formulation, a knowing violation of even a
criminal law does not necessarily need to be "culpable," and a life-
threatening violation of a civil law might be "culpable" even if not
considered criminal.113
For present purposes, these director exculpatory statutes have con-
siderable significance, since it is obviously undesirable to have any
conflict between desired conduct by the director and immunity from
suit. Thus, for example, a director should not be entitled to statutory
immunity for an intentional and unreasonable violation of law causing
damage to the corporation, and none of these statutes provide such
immunity. Note that these statutes should not be read to imply that a
director will necessarily be held liable in damages for a knowing viola-
tion, only that he may be sued for such a violation. The statutes only
insulate a director from suits for damages, so that a suit for injunction
or other equitable relief is still possible. 14 Therefore, director viola-
tion of law, whether civil or criminal and whether knowing or uninten-
tional, can still presumably subject the director to a shareholder's suit
for an injunction against continued violations.
V. STATE STATUTES ON CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION OF
DIRECTORS
State statutes which provide for indemnification of directors against
liability arising from their status as directors also provide exceptions
for certain types of conduct which will bar indemnification. 1 5 Again,
it is undesirable to have any basic conflict between desired conduct by
the director and the statutory right of indemnification, although it is
recognized that in some circumstances a director may be indemnified
for conduct constituting a breach of duty." 6 However, a director
should not be indemnified, for example, against the consequences of
112. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 7.10(a)(1)-(2), cmt. f(i)
(withholding business judgment rule protection from a board or committee decision to seek
dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit charging such a violation); id. § 7.19(1), cmt. f (with-
holding protection of charter provision shielding director from liability for such violation).
113. Id. § 7.19(1), cmt. f.
114. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(c) (West 1990) (providing that a company's articles of
incorporation can only limit director liability for monetary damages).
115. See generally 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 22 (discussing indemnification in
various contexts).
116. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 8.50, at 8-291 (1990) (providing that a director
acting in good faith and with a reasonable belief that his conduct was in the best interests of the
corporation may be indemnified even if his conduct was a violation of a statutory or common
law duty); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 7.20(a)(1), cmt. e (stating
that a director acting in good faith and with a reasonable belief that the conduct was in the best
interest of the corporation may be indemnified even if his conduct was a violation of a statutory
or common law duty); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 204(a)(11), 317(g) (West 1990) (dictating that a
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intentional and unreasonable violation of law which causes damage to
the corporation.
These state statutes generally divide indemnification into two cate-
gories, permissive and mandatory. 117 Permissive indemnification au-
thorizes, but does not require, the corporation to indemnify the
director against certain liability, thereby removing questions present
at corporate common law about the corporation's authority to indem-
nify.'1 8 Typically, permissive indemnification provisions are further
divided into two categories: (1) suits brought by or on behalf of the
corporation against the director; and (2) suits brought by third parties,
public or private.11 9 Mandatory indemnification requires the corpora-
tion to indemnify the director against certain liability, typically where
the director has been successful in his defense against the asserted
liability. 20 Further, most statutes provide that the statutory provi-
sions are nonexclusive of other rights which the director may have to
indemnification by contract or otherwise.' 2' Finally, most statutes
provide for corporate advancement of expenses if the director agrees
to repay in the event he is ultimately held not to be entitled to
indemnification. 122
Significantly, all of these statutes provide in some fashion for exclu-
sion of a right to indemnity for conduct that violates the law, particu-
larly the criminal law.123 Taking the Delaware statute as an example,
in suits by or in the right of the corporation, the director may be in-
demnified against expenses (including attorneys' fees but not includ-
corporation may not indemnify a director for breach of duty to the corporation for acts which
cannot be included in the certificate of incorporation's director immunity provisions).
117. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 22-3. However, the New York statute makes
permissive indemnification available to directors even where the corporation refuses to grant
any indemnification unless, prior to the act in question, a corporate standard exists prohibiting
or limiting indemnification in general. N.Y. Bus. Coiu. LAW §§ 724, 725(b)(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1995); see Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, 828 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a
former officer sued for RICO violation by corporation was entitled to advance of expenses even
though the board refused advance and made findings of lack of good faith and reasonable
belief).
118. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 22-1.
119. Id. §§ 22-7, 22-8.
120. Id. § 22-11.
121. Id. § 22-13.
122. Id. § 22-14.
123. One New York court denied indemnification to a corporate officer who had settled a
sexual harassment suit by a female employee, finding an absence of good faith or reasonable
belief that the officer's actions were in the best interests of the corporation. Kaufman v. CBS,
Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987). However, the court then transferred the action to
the New York State Supreme Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 621; see gener-
ally Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of
Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279 (1991) (surveying statutes and cases
dealing with indemnification of officers for criminal convictions).
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ing amounts paid in settlement) actually and reasonably incurred by
him in the defense or settlement of the action "if he acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation.' 12 4 The inquiry into the direc-
tor's good faith and reasonable belief is made by: (1) a majority of the
disinterested directors, even if less than a quorum; (2) independent
legal counsel in a written opinion; or (3) the stockholders.12 5 If the
director is adjudged liable to the corporation, indemnification for ex-
penses (but not the amount of the judgment) may be made only pur-
suant to a determination by the court that the director is "fairly and
reasonably entitled to indemnity" despite the adjudication. 2 6 Finally,
if the director is successful "on the merits or otherwise" in defense of
the action, he is entitled to indemnification as a matter of right.' 2 7
In the case of any action other than one by or in the right of the
corporation, the director can be indemnified against expenses (includ-
ing attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement
if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1991); see also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1995) (providing that a director may be entitled to indemnity if, in good faith, he
reasonably believed his conduct to be in, or in the case of requested service with another com-
pany, not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c) (West
1990) (allowing indemnification if the person "acted in good faith, in a manner the person be-
lieved to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders"). Both the New York
and California statutes apparently allow indemnification of expenses and amounts paid in settle-
ment, but only with the approval of the court in which the action was brought. See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 317(c) (West 1990) (allowing indemnification of settlement awards with court approval);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (indemnification of settlement awards
permissible only with court approval). For a discussion of the California statute, see HAROLD
MARSH, JR., MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 10.44 (3d ed. 1990).
125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (Supp. 1994); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(e) (West 1990)
(stating that determination is made by a majority of a quorum of disinterested directors, or if
such is not available, then by independent counsel in a written opinion, or by disinterested share-
holders, or by the court where the proceeding is pending). In New York, no indemnification
may be made except by a court in the case of settlement or loss of a suit or threatened suit by or
in the right of the corporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1995); WHITE
ON NEW YORK CORPORATIONS, BusINEss CORPORATION LAW 722.05 (Isidore Kantrowitz &
Sol Slutsky, eds., 13th ed. 1995).
126. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1991); see Yiannatsis v. Stephanis by Sterianou,
653 A.2d 275, 280-81 (Del. 1995) (holding that a director who usurped corporate opportunity
was not fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity); see also 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note
105, § 22-10 (discussing court-approved indemnification when director found liable and parties
reach settlement). For statutes stating that a director adjudged to be liable can only receive
indemnification if the court determines that he is fairly and reasonably entitled to it, see N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c)(1) (West 1990).
127. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1990)
(awarding indemnification only when success "on the merits"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1995) (granting indemnification when success on the merits or otherwise).
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in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. 2 8 An ad-
verse judgment in the action does not create any presumption that the
director failed to act in good faith or with such reasonable belief.'2 9 In
the case of a criminal action, the director also must have "had no rea-
sonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful;" however, a con-
viction does not create any presumption that he had such reasonable
cause.130 As with settlement of a suit by or on behalf of the corpora-
tion, the director's eligibility for indemnification in the loss or settle-
ment of a third-party suit is determined by a majority of the
independent directors, independent counsel, or the shareholders;' 31
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1991); see Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d
339, 344 (Del. 1983) (holding that former directors were entitled to indemnification for expenses
incurred during proxy contest litigation in which they were plaintiffs). But see Shearin v. E.F.
Hutton Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 593-95 (Del. Ch. 1994) (finding that a corporate officer who
was a plaintiff in an unsuccessful RICO suit against the corporation was not entitled to indemni-
fication since the suit was not brought in her official capacity to benefit the corporation). In New
York, as in the case of actions by or on behalf of the corporation, the director may be indemni-
fied if he reasonably believed his acts were in, or in the case of requested service with another
company, not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation. N.Y. Bus. CoP. L. § 722(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1995). In California, as in actions by or on behalf of the corporation, the
director may be indemnified if he acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief that the action
served the best interests of the corporation. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (West 1990).
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1991). For analogous statutes in other jurisdictions, see,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 722(b) (McKinney Supp.
1995). In Plate v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 275 Cal. Rptr. 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), the court held
that an employee found liable for inducing the corporation to terminate its contract with the
plaintiff so that the corporation could enter into a similar agreement with him committed inten-
tional wrongdoing precluding a finding of good faith which would have entitled the employee to
statutory indemnity. Id. at 673.
130. DEL. CODE ANN.4. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1991). For analogous corporate statutes in other juris-
dictions, see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. §§ 722(a)-(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1995). In Associated Milk Producers, Inc. v. Parr, 528 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Ark.
1979), a case arising under Kansas law, the plaintiff was an officer of the defendant corporation
who had been convicted, upon a plea of guilty, of using corporate funds to make unlawful contri-
butions to campaigns for federal office. Id. at 7. The plaintiff sued to be indemnified for the
fines, legal fees and expenses he incurred as a result of the criminal litigation. Id. The court
found that the plaintiff reasonably believed the contributions to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and that they had been made with the knowledge and acquiescence of the board of
directors. Id. at 8. Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiff had no reason to doubt that the
payments were unlawful and, therefore, he could not establish the good faith necessary for in-
demnity. Id.; cf Cambridge Fund, Inc. v. Abella, 501 F. Supp. 598, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding that an SEC consent decree reciting findings of willful securities law violations did not
constitute an adjudication of wrongdoing which would bar indemnification); Merritt-Chapman &
Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141-43 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (holding that a conviction,
based on pleas of nolo contendere, to perjury and filing false documents with the SEC consti-
tuted adjudication of wrongdoing which barred mandatory indemnification, but permitting in-
demnification for other charges which were dropped).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (Supp. 1994). In California, this determination is made
first by a majority of a quorum of disinterested directors, or if not available, by independent
counsel in a written opinion, the disinterested shareholders, or the court where the action is
pending. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(e) (West 1990). Under New York law, unlike in the case of
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his right to indemnity is absolute in the event of a successful
defense.132
The question often arises as to what constitutes a successful defense
"on the merits or otherwise." Generally, any successful defense, in
whole or in part (in which case fees are prorated), has been held to
qualify, such as where the government withdraws certain counts of an
indictment in return for a nolo contendere plea on another count. 133
However, a dismissal without prejudice because identical litigation is
pending elsewhere does not constitute success on the merits or other-
wise.134 Where a case is settled and dismissed with prejudice without
loss or settlement of a suit by or on behalf of the corporation, the determination in third-party
suits may be made by a quorum of independent directors, the board upon the opinion of in-
dependent counsel, or the shareholders. N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 723(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
However, the Supreme Court may award permissive indemnification to a director or officer
acting in good faith and with a reasonable belief despite the refusal of the corporation or a
contrary determination by the board or the shareholders, unless such indemnification is prohib-
ited by a corporate standard in effect at the time of the director's actions. Id. §§ 724-725(b)(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1995).
132. DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1990)
(providing for mandatory indemnification only upon a successful defense on the merits); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. L. § 723(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (providing for mandatory indemnification for a
successful defense on the merits or otherwise). In Green v. Westcap Corp., 492 A.2d 260 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1985), the plaintiff, former chief financial officer of the defendant corporation, had
been acquitted of criminal charges that he defrauded a lender to the corporation by supplying
false financial statements. Id. at 262. The court ruled that since plaintiff had been successful in
his defense, he did not have to establish good faith or reasonable belief, although affirmative
defenses of laches, estoppel and waiver remained to be tried. Id. at 265; see also McLean v.
International Harvester Co., 902 F.2d 372, 374-76 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a former corpo-
rate officer was entitled under Delaware law to legal fees for his successful pro se defense of a
criminal charge alleging violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act where adequate counsel
was not provided by the corporation); Stewart v. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., 414
N.Y.S.2d 910, 915-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding that a former president who was the target
of investigation but not indicted was entitled under Delaware law to mandatory indemnification
related to his testimony before grand jury); cf. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Schigur, 148
Cal. Rptr. 116, 117-18 (Cal. App. Ct. 1978) (denying mandatory indemnity where no determina-
tion was made that the corporate officer's defense was meritorious); People v. Uran Mine Corp.,
216 N.Y.S.2d 985, 991 (N.Y. App. 1961) (denying indemnification for a successful defense where
the defendant failed to prove good faith conduct).
133. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 140 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
But see Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970) (finding
director unsuccessful in gaining indemnification where conspiracy count modified by dismissing
securities fraud charge); see also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Wanzer, Nos. 89C-MR-216,
89C-SE-26, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 222 (Del. Super. Ct. June 19, 1990) (awarding mandatory
indemnification where ex-employee successfully defended three counts of a civil complaint yet
failed to successfully defend the fourth count for breach of fiduciary duty); Dornan v.
Humphrey, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951), modified other grounds, 112 N.Y.S.2d 585
(N.Y. App. Div. 1952) (dismissing action because statute of limitations bar constitutes a success-
ful defense for purposes of indemnification); ichner v. Andrews, 85 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1949), appeal dismissed, 90 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949) (dismissal for failure to post
security for costs constitutes a successful defense for purposes of indemnification).
134. Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698, 701-02 (D. Del. 1973).
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any payment by one of several defendants, that defendant may claim
that he has been successful for purposes of indemnification. 135 How-
ever, in Waltuch v. ContiCommodity Services,136 where a corporation
paid $37 million to settle charges of fraud allegedly due to the plaintiff
employee's unlawful trades in the silver market, the court held that
the plaintiff had not been successful and, therefore, was not entitled to
indemnification for $2.3 million in legal expenses, even though he had
been released from liability without payment as a co-defendant. 137
The Delaware statute also provides that its terms are not exclusive
of any other rights to indemnification under contract or otherwise. 138
Finally, the statute provides that a corporation may advance funds to a
director who undertakes to repay the advance if the court ultimately
decides that he is not entitled to indemnification. 139 The right to ad-
vances is independent of the right to indemnification, since advances
must be made if agreed to by contract regardless of the ultimate right
to indemnification. 140 Conversely, even if the corporate bylaws pro-
135. B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that
under Pennsylvania law, dismissal with prejudice of suit charging securities fraud due to co-
defendant's payment of settlement is success for purposes of indemnification).
136. 833 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
137. Id. at 310-11.
138. DEL. CODE. Ar. tit. 8, § 145(0 (1991). In Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., 495
N.E.2d 562 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986), the plaintiff represented the former president and chairman
of the board of the defendant corporation. Despite the officer's guilty plea to a criminal charge
of filing false information with the SEC, the court found he was entitled to contractual indemni-
fication of the expense of defending against a related SEC civil investigation. Id. at 565. While
the plaintiff did not make any claim for services relating to the guilty plea, the trial court noted
that the plea would not be disqualifying even if such a claim had been made. Id. at 568; cf. N.Y.
Bus. CoRP. L. § 721 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (providing that while the statute is nonexclusive, no
director shall be indemnified if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the director
"establishes that his acts were committed in bad faith or were the result of active and deliberate
dishonesty and were material to the cause of action so adjudicated"). In California, statutory
indemnification for third-party suits is non-exclusive, but a director's breach of duty to the cor-
poration can only be indemnified under the statute, or under an articles of incorporation provi-
sion consistent with Section 204(a)(11), which prohibits indemnification of actions from which a
director may not be relieved of liability under Section 204(a)(10), such as intentional misconduct
or a knowing and culpable violation of law. Id. § 317(g). Indemnification of an agent other than
a director or officer may be broader. Id.; see Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
314, 322-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that non-director/officer employee may have contrac-
tual indemnification rights broader than those permitted under Section 317(e)).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (1991). In Greenspan v. Mesirow, 485 N.E.2d 1196 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985), the court found that under Delaware law, the defendant directors charged with
misconduct were not entitled to advance their own expenses without approval by other, disinter-
ested directors. Id. at 1201; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(0 (West 1990) (stating that ex-
penses may be advanced if the director undertakes to repay them in the event he is not entitled
to indemnification); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. L. §§ 723(c), 724(c), 725(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (con-
taining similar provisions, with the exception that the court may order the corporation to pay
expenses upon a determination that the director has raised genuine issues of fact or law).
140. Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 822 (Del. 1992).
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vide that "the corporation shall indemnify" directors to the extent
permitted by Delaware law, such a provision does not entitle the di-
rector to advances. 141 The Delaware Chancery Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all actions for advances or indemnification,
whether pursuant to the statute or otherwise. 142
A review of the various state statutes reveals that none of them
seriously interfere with the desired goal of corporate director compli-
ance with the law. 143 One author's recent conclusion that corpora-
tions are "routinely" and "willingly, even eagerly" indemnifying their
executives who have been convicted of crimes is not supported by the
facts.144 The author cites the pre-statutory New York case of Simon v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.' 45 as an example of eager indemnification of
criminals in violation of public policy.1 46 The author, a former federal
prosecutor, failed to mention the fact that the directors in that case
did not deliberately intend to violate the antitrust laws.' 47 The find-
ings of the court in the subsequent shareholder's derivative suit were
as follows:
The evidence supports this conclusion. It does not show that de-
fendants acted fraudulently, negligently, corruptly or in bad
faith.... Applying these principles, it would seem that defendants
did not fail in their duty of reasonable care. At most, they made an
honest and reasonable mistake or error of judgment or of law.... It
seems to follow that, as defendants did not knowingly exceed their
authority or the authority of the corporation, and did not know or
believe or have reason to believe that their participation in the buy-
ing program was prohibited by the Sherman Act, they cannot be
held personally liable for damages.' 48
141. Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. Ch. 1992). Contra Barry v.
Barry, 28 F.3d 848, 858 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that under Minnesota law, a director is entitled
to advances and indemnification unless the corporation alters this scheme).
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(k) (Supp. 1994). This recently enacted provision should
eliminate the possibility of obtaining punitive damages for wrongful failure to indemnify. See,
e.g., Salaman v. National Media Corp., C.A. No. 92C-01-161, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 353 (Del.
Super. Ct. July 22, 1994) (denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and uphold-
ing jury award of $1.55 million in punitive damages).
143. See supra note 123 (discussing state statutory regulations limiting indemnification of
directors).
144. See, e.g., Bury, supra note 123, at 279, 281 (discussing the willingness of corporations to
indemnify their directors).
145. 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944).
146. See Buoy, supra note 123, at 281 n.7, 314-15 (discussing the indemnification of the direc-
tors in the Simon case who pled nolo contendre to criminal antitrust charges).
147. 38 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73.
148. Id. at 273-74. Professor Bury also cites Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961), in
support of her thesis, which also is a case where it is doubtful that any deliberate violation of the
antitrust laws occurred. See MARSH, supra note 124, at 740-42, 750 (suggesting that the defend-
ant might very well have established that his conduct was entirely lawful). Finally, Professor
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Given the author's clear understanding of the principle that the gov-
ernment need not prove specific intent (or any intent) to violate the
law in order to obtain a criminal conviction, 149 it is hard to understand
her public policy arguments. Commentators have argued just as stren-
uously that there is generally no reason under either corporate or
criminal law to shift corporate loss to executives after criminal prose-
cution of the corporation. 150 This position must also be regarded as
extreme.
VI. THE IMPACT OF INSURANCE ON DIRECTOR BEHAVIOR
Almost all states statutorily permit a corporation to purchase insur-
ance at corporate expense in order to indemnify directors and officers
against any liability asserted by reason of their service or corporate
status.' 5 ' Typically, as provided in the Delaware statute, insurance
may be provided against liability "whether or not the corporation
would have the power to indemnify [the director or officer] against
such liability," so the limitations discussed above concerning indemni-
fication would not apply.152 However, New York law, for example,
does not allow the corporation to provide insurance where the con-
tract of insurance fails to include "a retention amount and ... co-
insurance" in a manner acceptable to the New York superintendent of
Bucy cites for support an article in Harper's magazine on the conviction of the Fruehauf Corp.
and two of its top officers for federal excise tax evasion. Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of
Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24
IND. L. REv. 279, 281 n. 7 (1991). That conviction was upheld in United States v. Fruehauf
Corp., 577 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). However, a related stock-
holder's derivative suit against the officers was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations;
the facts of the case are not evident from the opinion. See Nathan v. Rowan, 651 F.2d 1223,
1226-27 (6th Cir. 1981) (concluding that the lower court's dismissal of the case due to a lapse of
the statute of limitations period barred the plaintiff's claim under the doctrine of res judicata).
149. See Bucy, supra note 123, at 293-303 (explaining that a criminal conviction does not al-
ways require proof of specific intent); see also United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995) (holding that the government need not prove
that corporate managers knew that their acts violated the Clean Water Act or the company's
discharge permit in order to obtain felony conviction); accord U.S. v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 539
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 773 (1996) (concluding that the government did not need
to prove that the officer knew his conduct to be unlawful to establish liability under the Clean
Water Act).
150. See, e.g., Richard I. Werder, Jr., A Critical Assessment of Intracorporate Loss Shifting
After Prosecutions Based on Corporate Wrongdoing, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35 (1993) (arguing that
due to notions of collective responsibility and problematic behavior by plaintiffs' attorneys, the
objectives of corporate and criminal law may actually be undermined by loss-shifting litigation).
151. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 23-4 (discussing state statutory authorization
of director and officer liability insurance).
152. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1991) (providing that a corporation may main-
tain insurance for an officer regardless of whether or not the corporation has the authority to
indemnify that officer).
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insurance. 153 New York law also prohibits insurance other than for
the cost of defense where the risk is uninsurable under state law, or
where a judgment establishes that the director or officer was guilty of,
among other things, "acts of active and deliberate dishonesty."'1 54
Even if the statute permits any kind of insurance, this does not
mean that insurance is available for intentional wrongdoing, for a vari-
ety of reasons.155 For example, the definition of loss against which
insurance is provided typically excludes "fines, penalties, or multiple
damages imposed by law, or matters which are uninsurable under the
law."'1 56 Thus, where a judgment was entered against a condominium
association and certain of its directors for treble damages for civil
theft (conversion) and punitive damages for tortious interference with
contract, the court held that such damages were uninsurable as a mat-
ter of public policy. 157 Similarly, where a corporate president and
vice-president were sued for deliberately failing to pay corporate fed-
eral and state withholding, fuel and sales and use taxes, the court held
that such liability was uninsurable as a matter of law.' 58
Where the policy defines "wrongful act" for which insurance is pro-
vided as "any negligent act, error, omission, misstatement or mislead-
ing statement," it has been held that an intentional act, such as firing
an employee for filing an employment discrimination suit, is not cov-
ered. 59 In addition, violation of many statutes such as the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, RICO or the federal securities acts, may be
expressly excluded from insurance coverage, as well as many other
liabilities, including liability for dishonest, criminal or fraudulent con-
153. N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 726 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
154. Id.
155. See Bucy, supra note 123, at 331-36 (explaining that insurance not available for deliberate
and willful acts).
156. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, at 401-02 (citing the definition of "loss" that
appears in most corporate officer insurance policies).
157. Country Manors Ass'n v. Master Antenna Sys., 534 So. 2d 1187, 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
158. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 464 N.W.2d 535,539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); cf.
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Princehorn, No. 16463, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2039
(Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 1994), appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1994) (concluding that
liability is insurable if nonpayment was unintentional).
159. See Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 761 F.
Supp. 1485, 1487 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that the intentional firing of an employee did not
constitute a wrongful act); 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 24-4, at 400 (discussing the
insurance definition of "wrongful acts"). In Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18
Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 697-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), the court held that the California Insurance Code
and public policy barred suit against an insurer for coverage based upon the willful sexual har-
assment and assault of a female employee by the founder, president, chairman of the board and
major stockholder of the insured corporation.
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duct.160 Where the policy provides that "acts of active and deliberate
dishonesty" must be established by a judgment against the director or
officer, some courts have held that this finding must be made in the
underlying litigation and cannot be raised by the insurer after settle-
ment of that suit; however, other cases have held to the contrary de-
pending upon the express language of the policy.161 Newer policies
have been reworded to eliminate the requirement of a prior judgment
to establish dishonesty, thereby allowing the insurer to raise this issue
in the first instance during the coverage litigation.162
Where the director is sued together with the corporation, problems
of coverage and allocation arise since the directors and officers' liabil-
ity policy only covers liability of the director, or required or permitted
indemnification of the director by the corporation, rather than the lia-
bility of the corporation itself.163 Thus, where a savings association
and five of its officers were the target of a grand jury investigation into
charges of obtaining loan commitment fees through fraudulent repre-
sentations, the savings association entered a plea of nolo contendere to
a federal criminal information and made full restitution of fees total-
ling $795,000 in return for the government's agreement not to prose-
cute the individual officers.l 64 When the association filed suit against
its directors' and officers' insurer, the court held that the directors had
not sustained any loss since no claims for the payment of money had
been made against them, although such claims could have been
made.165
160. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, at ch. 25 (discussing insurance exclusions
generally).
161. See id. § 25-4 (discussing cases in which courts have held that the finding of dishonesty
had to be made during the initial litigation, not the subsequent coverage litigation); see also
Atlantic Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Casualty Co., 839 F.2d 212,214-15 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988) (holding that insurer could not raise issue of exclusion);
National Union Fire Ins. v. Seafirst Corp., 662 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (holding exclusion
not available); cf Finci v. American Casualty Co. v. State Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 593 A.2d
1069, 1086-87 (Md. 1991) (granting summary judgment for insured where no evidence of dishon-
esty proffered by insurer). For decisions holding that insurer could raise defense where policy
does not require a prior judgment, see American Casualty Co. v. United S. Bank, 950 F.2d 250,
254-55 (5th Cir. 1992); Stargatt v. Avenell, 434 F. Supp. 234, 242-44 (D. Del. 1977).
162. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 25-4, at 441 (discussing the recent practice
among courts of allowing the insurer to raise the issue of dishonesty during the coverage litiga-
tion); Arthur J. Washington, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: Coverage Disputes, in
DIREcrORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILrTY INSURANCE (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 415, 1987).
163. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 23-2, at 337 (noting that director liability
policies do not insure the corporation against its own liability).
164. MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Home State Say. Ass'n, 797 F.2d 285, 286 (6th Cir. 1986).
165. Id. at 287-88.
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To illustrate the problem of allocation, consider a class action
"fraud on the market" lawsuit brought against Raychem Corporation
and twelve of its directors and officers under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, based upon allegedly false and mis-
leading public statements regarding Raychem's historical and
projected earnings. 166 The lawsuit was settled for $19.5 million, of
which the insurer paid $11.25 million and Raychem paid $8.25 mil-
lion. 167 Raychem then indemnified the individual defendants for the
$8.25 million and $1.6 million in defense costs, and brought suit for
reimbursement against Federal Insurance Company, the insurer under
the directors' and officers' liability policy. 168
The court held that neither federal nor state law prohibited indem-
nification of the directors and officers since there had been no admis-
sion or finding of a violation of the securities laws, and the
disinterested Raychem directors found that the defendants acted in
good faith and with a reasonable belief that their actions were in the
best interests of the corporation. 169 However, the court allowed the
insurer to conduct discovery on the issue of whether indemnification
in the case was made in good faith. 170 The court further held that the
settlement and defense costs were not "matters uninsurable under the
law" within the meaning of the policy exclusion, yet the court allowed
discovery as to whether the defendants' actions in the case were unin-
surable.171 The court reasoned that while scienter (an "intent to
deceive or defraud") is a required element for a section 10(b) viola-
tion, lower federal courts have held that reckless conduct (an "ex-
treme departure from the standards of ordinary care") will satisfy the
166. Raychem Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1994). An explo-
sion of fraud on the market lawsuits occurred following the four-Justice plurality decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The opinion in
Basic was authored by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
Id. at 225. All four Justices had been dissenters in a series of conservative Supreme Court securi-
ties law cases decided beginning in 1975. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy recused them-
selves for undisclosed reasons. Id. at 250. Justices White and O'Conner dissented with respect
to the holding of a presumption of reliance based upon the "fraud on the market" theory that a
stock trader relies upon the "integrity" of the market price and, therefore, is damaged for pur-
poses of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act when a misleading statement is made
because it is presumed that the market price reflects that statement. Id. at 255-57 (White, J.,
dissenting). No reliance on the misleading statement itself is required and this is the contention
with which the dissent disagreed. Id.
167. Raychem Corp., 853 F. Supp. at 1174.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1177-78.
170. Id. at 1185-86.
171. Id. at 1179-80, 1186.
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scienter requirement, and reckless conduct is not "intentional" or
"willful" conduct which otherwise would be uninsurable. 172
Finally, the insurer argued that the settlement had to be allocated
since uninsured third parties were also liable, namely the corporation
itself and non-officer or director employees of the corporation. 173
However, the court held that allocation was inappropriate and in-
stead adopted what has become known as the "larger settlement
rule," that allocation is proper only when the settlement and defense
costs are higher than they would have been had only insured parties
been defended. 174 To the extent that the liability of the corporation
itself is only derived from conduct of insured parties, the insurer may
not complain; if uninsured third parties contributed to the underlying
wrongful conduct without increasing defense or settlement costs, then
the insurer may pursue its right to contribution through subroga-
tion. 175 Other courts have taken different approaches to the alloca-
tion problem depending on the particular circumstances involved.176
In summary, the existence of insurance against liability does not ap-
pear to present any significant opportunity for directors to escape the
consequences of intentional and unreasonable violation of law causing
damage to the corporation.
VII. A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE:
SOME CURRENT EXAMPLES OF CORPORATE VIOLATION
OF LAW
There is certainly no shortage of current examples of illegal corpo-
rate activity. TWo selected cases illustrate the general principles dis-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1180.
174. Id. at 1181-84; accord Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1432 (9th Cir.
1995) (stating that the "larger settlement rule" is best effectuated through the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1282, 1288
(9th Cir 1995) (stating that the "larger settlement rule" would be applied to determine liability of
insurer who insured against wrongful acts by directors or officers).
175. Raychem Corp., 853 F. Supp. at 1182.
176. See Slottow v. American Casualty Co., 10 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
settlement must be allocated between insured president and uninsured bank); see also Pepsico,
Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (providing that insurer
has the burden of proving what portion of the settlement costs should be attributed to the de-
fense of PepsiCo and its accountants); Health-Chem Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 559
N.Y.S.2d 435, 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (permitting allocation if factually possible, but the insurer
has the burden of proving what portion of the expenses was incurred in defense of a non-covered
party); see generally Julie J. Bisceglia, Comment, Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance-Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 690 (1985) (discussing the ramifications of corporate officers' liability insurance); Directors'
and Officers' Liability Insurance: A Case Study on Allocation of Defense Costs and Settlements,
Annual Meeting, American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, New Orleans, La. (1994).
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cussed above and demonstrate how these principles are applied in
practice.
A. Salomon Brothers, Inc. and the Treasury Auction Scandal
On August 9, 1991, the financial world was stunned when Salomon
Brothers issued a press release disclosing that the firm had uncovered
irregularities and rule violations in connection with its submission of
bids in certain auctions of Treasury securities. 177 The press release
also disclosed that the firm had suspended two managing directors:
Paul Mozer, the head of its government trading desk, and Thomas
Murphy, its chief trader in government securities. 178
On August 14, 1991, under pressure from government officials, Sal-
omon Brothers issued a second press release which disclosed that
three top Salomon executives had known since late April of 1991 that
Mozer submitted an illegal bid during the February 21, 1991, Treasury
notes auction in violation of U.S. Treasury rules.179 These three exec-
utives were John Gutfreund, chairman and chief executive officer;
Thomas Strauss, president; and John Meriwether, vice chairman, head
of fixed income trading and Mozer's immediate superior. 180
On August 18, 1991, these executives resigned their positions with
both Salomon Brothers and Salomon, Inc.;181 Mozer and Murphy
were fired the same day; and Donald Feuerstein, chief legal officer of
Salomon, Inc., resigned on August 23.182 During the third quarter of
1991, Salomon, Inc. recorded a $200 million charge against earnings to
reflect expected losses. 83 Warren Buffet became the interim chair-
man and chief executive officer of Salomon, Inc. and Salomon Broth-
177. SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30, 1991 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q, pt. II, item 5 & ex.
28(d). During the 1980's, Salomon Brothers became a dominant figure in the United States
government bond market, the corporate security underwriting business and the securitized mort-
gage market; see generally MICHAEL M. LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECK-
AGE ON WALL STREET (1989) (providing an earlier history of the firm and its major figures and
activities); MARTIN MAYER, NIGHTMARE ON WALL STREET (1993) (providing a detailed ac-
count of Salomon Brothers and the 1991 scandal). Pursuant to its authority under the Govern-
ment Securities Act Amendments of 1993, the Treasury Department recently issued proposed
regulations designed to prevent the conduct exposed in the Salomon scandal. See Government
Securities Act Regulations: Large Position Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (1995) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 400, 420) (requiring any person or entity controlling $2 billion or more in a Treas-
ury security to preserve certain records).
178. In re Salomon, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 5442, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8038, at *1, 7-10 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 1994).
179. Id.; see SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30, 1991 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 15.
180. In re Salomon, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8038, at *1, 7-10.
181. SALOMON INC., SEPTEMBER 30, 1991 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 11.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 7.
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ers.184 Prior to assuming this post, Mr. Buffet had been a director of
Salomon, Inc. since 1987 as well as its largest shareholder through
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.185
On May 20, 1992, the government reached a settlement with Salo-
mon, Inc. and Salomon Brothers. 18 6 The firms were to pay $100 mil-
lion to establish a civil claims fund for private litigants and an
additional $190 million to the United States Treasury as civil penalties
and asset forfeitures. 187 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York de-
cided to retain Salomon Brothers' designation as a primary dealer in
U.S. Treasury securities, but suspended the firm from trading with or
submitting customer bids to the Federal Reserve until August 3,
1992.188 No criminal charges were brought against the companies. 189
In the second quarter of 1992, Salomon, Inc. recorded a charge of
$185 million against earnings in addition to the $200 million already
reserved, for a total loss of $385 million.190
On December 3, 1992, Gutfreund, Strauss, and Meriwether, con-
sented to entry of an SEC order without admission or denial of the
Commission's facts, findings or conclusions. 19' Gutfreund was as-
sessed a civil penalty in the amount of $100,000 and ordered not to
associate in the future, in the capacity of chairman or chief executive
officer, with any firm regulated by the SEC; Strauss was assessed a
184. Id. at 11.
185. SALOMON, INC. PROXY STATEMENT FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 2,6
(May 1, 1991). In 1987, Berkshire acquired all 700,000 shares of Salomon's voting convertible
Preferred Stock for $700 million, and these shares represented about 14.3% of the outstanding
voting power of the corporation. Id. at 6, 12.
186. SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30, 1992 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 7.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Linda Himelstein, When the Company Becomes a Cop, Bus. WK., June 6, 1994, at 118
(noting that Salomon set the standard for cooperation by giving the government open access to
virtually all relevant documents and witnesses and waiving the attorney-client privilege); see gen-
erally R. Lane Sisung, Comment, The Law of Salomon: A History of the Regulation of Govern-
ment Securities, an Accounting of the Salomon Brothers Scandal and an Analysis of the
Government Securities Act Amendments of 1993, 40 LoY. L. REv. 313 (1994) (providing a com-
prehensive account of the Salomon scandal and the resulting Government Securities Act
Amendments of 1993).
190. SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30, 1992 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 8.
191. In re Gutfreund Exchange Act, Release No. 31,554, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2939 (Dec. 3,
1992). Donald Feuerstein also consented to issuance of the order without admitting or denying
any of its statements. Id. at *2. The suggestion that Feuerstein may not have acted appropriately
caused a furor in the securities bar. See William R. McLucas & Jeffrey Hiller, The Salomon Case
and the Supervisory Responsibilities of Lawyers and Compliance Personnel, INsIoHrs, May 1993,
at 3 (discussing the legal consequences of imposing liability on non-line supervisors); Sam S.
Miller & George E. Scargle, The Feuerstein Report: Legal and Compliance Officers On the Line,
INSIoHTS, Feb. 1993, at 5 (criticizing the SEC for failing to give non-line supervisors adequate
notice and guidance).
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penalty of $75,000 and suspended from associating for a period of six
months with any such firm; and Meriwether was assessed a penalty of
$50,000 and suspended for three months.192 Donald Feuerstein indi-
cated that he did not intend to work in the securities industry in the
future. 93
According to the SEC's findings, the U.S. Treasury Department had
for some time limited the maximum bid of any one bidder in an auc-
tion of Treasury securities at any given yield to 35 percent of the auc-
tion amount.194 At the February 21, 1991 auction of $9 billion of five-
year notes, Salomon Brothers submitted a bid in its own name of
$3.15 billion (35 percent of the notes) at 7.51 percent. 95 The firm also
submitted two false bids for the same amount in the names of two
established Salomon customers, Quantum Fund and Mercury Asset
Management, without their knowledge. 96 As a result, when the bids
were prorated, Salomon and its "customers" received a combined to-
tal of 56.7 percent of the auction amount. 97 Mozer then directed a
clerk at the firm's government trading desk to make fictitious entries
"selling" the $1.701 billion allocations to each of the customers, then
"selling" them back to Salomon with instructions not to send written
confirmations of the trades to the customers. 198 Unfortunately for
Mozer, S.G. Warburg, another primary dealer in U.S. Treasury securi-
ties and an affiliate of Mercury Asset Management, had submitted its
own bid in the February 21 auction for $100 million at 7.51 percent.199
This unforeseen development meant that S.G.Warburg had violated
the 35 percent limit, and the Treasury Department so advised
Warburg, Mercury Asset Management and Mozer by letter dated
April 17, 1991.200
Mozer promptly told the Senior Director at Mercury that he was
embarrassed by this situation, which he said resulted from a clerk's
error, and asked that the matter be kept confidential; Mercury
honored his request.20' Mozer then told Meriwether that he had sub-
mitted a false bid to satisfy demand for the securities from the firm's
government trading and government arbitrage desks.20 2 Shocked by
192. In re Gutfreund, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2939, at *50-51.
193. Id. at *46 n.23.
194. Id. at *5.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at * 5-6.
198. Id. at *7.
199. Id. at *8.
200. Id. at *8-10
201. Id.
202. Id. at *11.
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this information, Meriweather informed Strauss, his superior, and
Strauss informed both Gutfreund and Feuerstein.20 3 Feuerstein ad-
vised all three executives that the false bid constituted a criminal act
which, although probably not legally required, should be reported to
the federal government.2°4 Gutfreund did not report the false bid to
the government until August 9, 1991, nor did he inform the Salomon
Board of Directors until August 8.205
Meanwhile, Mozer submitted two more false bids at the April 25
and May 22 Treasury note auctions.20 6 In June and July of 1991, offi-
cials of the U.S. Treasury Department and the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department began an investigation into reports of a
"squeeze" (unavailability of notes to cover "short" positions) in the
market for the May 22 two-year Treasury notes which resulted from
the fact that Salomon and two of its customers had bought about 86
percent of the issue. 20 7 Salomon initiated its own internal investiga-
tion, which disclosed other false bids submitted in Treasury auctions in
1990 and 1991, and finally issued a press release on August 9.208
Mozer eventually entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. At-
torney's Office on November 19, 1992, under which he agreed to
plead guilty to two counts of making false statements to an agency of
the United States.20 9 The court accepted Mozer's plea,210 and he was
sentenced in December of 1993 to four months in prison and a $30,000
fine.211 On July 13, 1994, Mozer also consented to the entry of a judg-
ment enjoining him from violating the Securities Exchange Act and
assessing a civil penalty in the amount of $1.1 million, which included
a penalty for insider trading based upon his sale of Salomon, Inc. com-
203. Id. at *11-12.
204. Id. at *13-14.
205. Id. at *21, 29 n.11.
206. Id. at *18-21.
207. Id. at *23-26.
208. Id. at *26-30. According to an SEC order consented to by Daiwa Securities America,
Inc., Salomon had submitted false Treasury bids at least as far back as August 10, 1989. Daiwa,
another primary dealer in U.S. Treasury securities, had submitted a $3 billion bid in a Treasury
auction on that day, although the bid was in fact submitted on behalf of Salomon. In re Daiwa
Sec. Am., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 31,924, 1993 SEC LEXIS 378 (Feb. 25, 1993). Daiwa
is reportedly unrelated to Daiwa Bank Ltd., which was recently charged with criminal conduct in
covering up $1.1 billion in trading losses. See Timothy L. O'Brien, In a Signal to Japan, U.S. Bars
Daiwa Bank, Indicts It and Officials, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at Al (discussing the severity of
the potential sanctions against Daiwa Bank).
209. United States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Making false statements to a
government agency is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1002 (1988).
210. Margaret A. Jacobs, Paul Mozer Pleads Guilty in Case Tied to Treasury Bids, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 1, 1993, at B8.
211. John Connor, Ex-Bond Trader for Salomon to Pay $300,000, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1993,
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mon stock several days prior to the disclosures in the August 9, 1991
press release. 212 In addition, Mozer consented to an SEC order per-
manently barring him from employment in the securities industry or
submission of any bid in a Treasury auction except for his own account
or that of his immediate family.213
In late 1992 and early 1993, Salomon settled the compensation
claims of three of the four senior officers who left the company in
August of 1991; the claim of the fourth officer, John Gutfreund, was
submitted to arbitration under the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange. 214
In January and February of 1993, Salomon settled claims with forty-
two states and the District of Columbia concerning the 1991 Treasury
auction by placing $2 million in a multistate Investor Protection Trust
Fund and paying $2.15 million to the District of Columbia and the
states involved.21 5 The private lawsuits against Salomon and its direc-
tors and officers had begun on the business day following the August
9, 1991 press release. These suits can be categorized into three groups:
(i) The Securities Litigation. The first "fraud on the market" suit
was filed on August 12, 1991, in federal court in New York City.21 6
Other suits followed this one, and ultimately thirteen individual and
class action lawsuits were consolidated. 21 7 The defendants included
Salomon Inc., Salomon Brothers, Inc., and individual defendants Gut-
212. SEC v. Mozer & Murphy, Litigation Release No. 14,159, 1994 SEC LEXIS 2033
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1994).
213. Id. Nonetheless, Mr. Mozer's career as an unregulated investment adviser may not be
over. See Michael Siconolfi, Paul Mozer Wants to Start a Hedge Fund, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995,
at C1 (reporting that Mozer has requested SEC approval to serve as an unregistered investment
advisor). Murphy, who had earlier entered into a consent order with the SEC, paid a civil pen-
alty of $300,000 and consented to an industry bar for a term of years and an injunction against
further violations. SEC v. Mozer & Murphy, 1993 SEC LEXIS 3624 (Dec. 29, 1993).
214. SALOMON, INC., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 5-6, 1993; see James C. Hyatt,
Salomon Reaches Compensation Pacts with 2 Aides Who Left Amid Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5,
1993, at A5 (reporting settlements with Strauss and Meriwether). On May 13, 1994, the NYSE
arbitration panel denied Gutfreund's claims of $55.3 million in their entirety, and Gutfreund
filed an action in New York Supreme Court on August 12, 1994, seeking to vacate the arbitra-
tors' decision. SALOMON, INC., SEPTEMBER 30, 1994 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 11. On
December 31, 1994, the court confirmed the arbitrators' decision and Gutfreund filed an appeal.
SALOMON, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 4.
215. SALOMON, INC., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 2.
216. This action was captioned Mann v. Salomon, Inc., 91 Civ. 5442, filed August 12 in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. See SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30, 1991
QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 14 (discussing the nature of this litigation). As other parties
filed suit, the cases were consolidated into In re Salomon, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 91 Civ. 5442, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8038 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1994).
217. In re Salomon, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 5442, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8038, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
16, 1994).
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freund, Strauss, Meriwether, Mozer and Murphy.218 The plaintiffs
were all purchasers of Salomon, Inc. common stock and all other pub-
licly issued or traded securities of Salomon (including some purchas-
ers of call options for Salomon common stock) during the period
March 27 through August 14, 1991.219 Count I of the complaint
charged the defendants with failure to disclose the unlawful activities,
misleading statements in the Salomon Annual Report dated March
27, 1991 concerning the company's "ethical business conduct," and in-
adequate disclosure in the August 9, 1991, press release in violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule
10b-5 thereunder. 220 Count II charged that Salomon, Gutfreund, and
Strauss violated section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 by failing to
disclose the unlawful activities in the prospectus for a registered offer-
ing of Salomon debt securities.221
A proposal to settle the Securities Litigation was approved by Dis-
trict Court Judge Patterson on June 16, 1994.222 Under the terms of
the settlement, a total of $54.5 million would be paid to the plaintiffs
from the $100 million Civil Claims Fund established in the May 29,
1992 settlement agreement with the government.223 The court also
approved $9.6 million in attorneys fees, to be paid by Salomon in ad-
dition to the $54.5 million.224
(ii) The Treasury Litigation. The first suit by purchasers of U.S.
Treasury notes who were allegedly damaged by Salomon's actions was
brought on August 13, 1991, in federal court in New York City.225 Ul-
timately, ten class actions were consolidated, and in addition, six indi-
viduals filed separate actions.226 The class actions charged that
plaintiffs were injured by defendants' conduct in rigging bids in the
April, May, and June 1991 auctions of U.S. Treasury notes and engag-
218. Id. at *1-2.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *10.
221. Id. Count III charged that Gutfreund and Strauss were liable for the violations charged
in Counts I and II in their capacity as controlling persons of Salomon under section 15 of the
1933 Act and Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. Id.
222. Id. at *1-2.
223. Id. at *3; see also SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30, 1994 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 19
(explaining the company's legal proceedings).
224. In re Salomon, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8038, at *48.
225. This action was captioned Katz v. Salomon, Inc., 91 Civ. 5471, filed August 13, 1991, in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. See SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30,
1991 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 15 (summarizing the legal actions relevant to Salomon,
Inc.).
226. SALOMON, INC., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 4. The consolidated actions were
captioned In re Salomon Bros. Treasury Litig., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 98,119 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1994).
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ing in a "squeeze" on the market for those securities in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sherman Act, the Commodi-
ties Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act.227 The defendants included parties other than Salomon.
The consolidated actions were settled on July 26, 1994, with court
approval for a total payment by Salomon of $66 million, including
plaintiffs' attorneys fees and expenses, almost two-thirds of which will
be paid from the $100 million Civil Claims Fund established in May of
1992.228 Defendants Steinhardt Management Co. and related entities
agreed to pay $22 million, and Caxton Corporation agreed to pay $12
million; the only defendant who failed to settle was Paul Mozer.229
The court also approved plaintiffs' counsel fees of $25 million and $3.5
million in expenses.230 Steinhardt and Caxton later paid an additional
$76 million to settle charges of violations of the securities and antitrust
laws by the SEC and the Justice Department.231
(iii) The Derivative Litigation. Sixteen shareholders' derivative
suits, initially filed in August of 1991, were consolidated in federal
court in New York City.232 The complaint asserted claims in a deriva-
tive capacity on behalf of Salomon, Inc., and in a double derivative
capacity on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiary, Salomon Brothers,
Inc.233 The individual defendants included Gutfreund, Strauss, Mer-
iwether and Mozer.234 The complaint alleged a violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and breach of fiduciary
duty under state law.235 The damages sought exceeded $326 million,
including $290 million paid to the government, an additional $32.1
227. See In re Salomon Bros. Treasury Litig. at 98,927 (ordering Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to produce documents).
228. SALOMON, INC., JUNE 30, 1994 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 19. One suit by a
plaintiff who opted out of the settlement remains pending. See Three Crown Limited Partnership
v. Caxton Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (complaint states cause of action under the
Sherman Act); SALOMON, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 3-4 (discussing the sanc-
tions resulting from the Treasury Litigation).
229. Frances A. McMorris, Salomon Settlement, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1994, at B2.
230. Id.; see also John Connor, Settlement of Suit Over Treasury Notes Considers $24 Million in
Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1994, at A9 (discussing the proposed settlement of action
against Salomon, Inc.).
231. SEC v. Steinhardt Management Co., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,483 (Dec. 16, 1994); John Connor, Steinhardt, Caxton to Pay $76 Million to Settle
U.S. Charges of Manipulation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1994, at B10; Laura Jereski, Steinhardt to
Shutter His Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1995, at Cl.
232. In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454 (Sept. 28, 1994).






million paid pursuant to settlement of the Securities Litigation and the
Treasury Litigation, and $4.1 million paid in settlement of state regula-
tory claims. 236 The U.S. District Court granted a motion by the indi-
vidual defendants to compel arbitration of the issues raised in the
Derivative Litigation under the rules of the New York Stock Ex-
change.2 37 However, the New York Stock Exchange declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction and the federal courts refused to appoint a substitute
arbitrator.2 38 In October 1995, the case was settled pending court ap-
proval of $40 million in cash and noncash consideration, of which Sal-
omon will retain $22.5 million after payment of attorneys fees and
expenses.239
With regard to this case, one could not argue that the Board of Di-
rectors overprotected guilty members of management, or otherwise
failed to act in the best interests of the shareholders to preserve and
protect the corporation. Indeed, with respect to disciplinary action
against responsible members of management, if anything, the Board
erred on the side of severity in order to placate the federal govern-
ment. Of course, whether or not the company will return to its former
profitability remains an open question.2 40
1. The Board Acted Swiftly to Make Changes in Top Management
The Board concluded that half-measures would not be enough to
prevent disaster. The corporation was threatened with the loss of its
designation as a primary dealer in U.S. Treasury securities. Not only
did the company face a blizzard of private suits and administrative
proceedings, but it remained in great danger of facing criminal
charges. Consequently, the Board terminated the two managing di-
rectors believed to have participated in the criminal conduct, and it
accepted the resignations of the three top corporate officers who had
knowledge of the situation.
236. Id. at *5.
237. Id. at *1.
238. In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming
the District Court's decisions to deny arbitration).
239. See Michael Siconolfi, Former Salomon Officers Are Settling Suit Over '91 Scandal for
$40 Million, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1995, at C15. Reportedly, Gutfreund, Strauss and Meriwether
together paid a total of $12 million in cash, the insurers paid $21 million in cash and the remain-
ing $7 million noncash consideration included a surrender of indemnification claims. Id.
240. See Michael Siconolfi, Salomon Brothers Expects Defections with New Pay Plan, WALL
ST. J., March 27, 1995, at A3 (noting that the Salomon Brothers Chairman Maughan referred to
the company's 1994 loss as "appalling"); Leah Nathans Spiro, Turmoil at Salomon, Bus. WK.,
May 1, 1995, at 144 (reporting that "huge losses and a talent drain have [the company] reeling");
Suzanne Woolley, A Sleeper Named Solly, Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 104 (noting that Salomon,
Inc. ranked among the Council of Institutional Investors' list of 20 worst performing public
companies).
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Under the circumstances, one could object that Warren Buffet, a
controlling shareholder, was in a position to force drastic changes in
management. But normally a major shareholder or independent
members of the Board will have the motivation and authority to take
corrective action. 241 Even if such motivation or authority does not
exist, the company can be sold to a new owner who could act;242 if the
situation continues to deteriorate, the company may be forced into
bankruptcy.243
241. See Rhonda L. Rundle, National Medical Sees Fraud Settlement Ultimately Costing About
$375 Million, WALL ST. J., April 15, 1994, at A3 (indicating that National Medical Chairman
Jeffry C. Barbakow assumed control of management and quickly moved to settle outstanding
civil and criminal charges); see also SEC v. National Medical Enters., Litigation Release No.
14,156, 1994 SEC LEXIS 2098 (July 12, 1994) (stating that on June 29, 1994, National Medical
pled guilty to six counts of criminal charges and paid a total of $362.7 million to the United
States government, as well as an additional $16.3 million to private hospitals).
Eddie Antar, the founder of Crazy Eddie, Inc., lost control of the company in 1987 in a tender
offer made by a group of private investors who later claimed that the company overstated its
inventory by $65 million. See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(related fraud on the market and RICO litigation settled for $42 million); see also United States
v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that trial judge should have disqualified himself for
bias); SEC v. Antar, 71 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 1995) (removing trial judge for bias in related cases);
Wade Lambert, Crazy Eddie Founder's Conviction In Stock Fraud Case Is Reversed, WALL ST.
J., April 13, 1995, at B4.
The chief executive officer and a director of Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., indicted for
grand larceny for misappropriation of company funds, was removed from his office as CEO for
cause and then removed as a director for cause. See PROXY STATEMENT OF ORANGE & ROCK-
LAND U-n s. 2, 7-12 (April 6, 1994). The New York Supreme Court upheld his removal. Smith
v. Orange & Rockland Utils., 617 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1994). He was found not guilty of
income tax evasion in a related case, although the prosecutor himself resigned from office in a
bizarre turn of events and pled guilty himself to tax evasion. See Expenses: Fiction, Maybe, but a
Crime?, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 42 (discussing the acquittal of Orange & Rockland Utilities'
CEO and the conviction of his prosecutor).
242. See Nicholas Bray & Glenn Whitney, Baring's Collapse Tied to Wide Cast in Special Re-
port, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at A8 (finding broad responsibility for collapse). Following the
disastrous losses in derivatives futures of about $1.5 billion, allegedly due to unauthorized trad-
ing at the Singapore office of Barings PLC by Nicholas Leeson, the company was taken over by
Internationale Nederlanden Groep NV, a Dutch financial group. Changes in top management
were made immediately. See JUDrrH H. RAWNSLEY, TOTAL RISK (1995) (providing an account
of the scandal).
243. In February of 1990, pressured by its lenders, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
the New York Stock Exchange, the SEC and the U.S. Treasury Department, the board of the
powerful firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. voted to file for bankruptcy. See JAMES B.
STEWART, DEN OF TsUEvEs 506-507 (1992) (providing an historical account of the investigations
and convictions of Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky); see also In re Joseph, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 32,340, 1993 SEC LEXIS 1239 (May 20, 1993) (barring former Drexel chief executive
officer Joseph from employment in a supervisory capacity in the securities industry for three
years for failure to supervise Michael Milken); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 995 F.2d
1138 (2d Cir. 1993) (settling Drexel's claims against Milken and others for $1.3 billion).
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2 The Board Adopted a Neutral Position in the Derivative
Litigation
The corporation originally moved to dismiss the shareholders' de-
rivative suits for failure to make pre-suit demand on the Board of Di-
rectors, but then withdrew that motion when the uninvolved directors
were dismissed as individual defendants. 244 The corporation also did
not seize control of the litigation by forming a special litigation com-
mittee of the board for the purpose of making recommendations con-
cerning prosecution of the suits. 245 In addition, although the
terminated executives made claims for indemnification against the
pending litigation, the Board on September 5, 1991, determined that it
would not advance any further legal fees or expenses in defense of the
terminated employees, including Gutfreund and Strauss.246 It cannot
be said that the Board itself should have brought suit against the de-
parting executives. While the individual defendants in the derivative
suit might eventually be found liable to the corporations, few individu-
als are capable of paying damages of $350 million,247 and the firm's
directors' and officers' liability insurance policy would undoubtedly
244. SALOMON, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 4. The company's motion to dis-
miss for failure to make demand on the Board probably stood a good chance of being granted.
See generally DEBORAH A. DEMOTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONs: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE §§ 5:12-13 (1994) (showing that suits are frequently dismissed if plaintiffs do not make a
pre-suit demand).
In a derivative suit brought by E.F. Hutton shareholders, the court held that demand on the
Board cannot be avoided simply by alleging that the directors condoned and acquiesced in illegal
conduct. In re E.F. Hutton Banking Practices Litig., 634 F. Supp. 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see
also Shields v. Singleton, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to excuse
demand by general allegations that Teledyne directors aided and abetted criminal fraud and
corruption in the procurement of defense contracts); In re Baxter Int'l, Inc. Shareholder Litig.,
654 A.2d 1268, 1270-71 (Del. Ch. 1995) (allegations of director failure to prevent violations of
criminal law do not excuse demand); Cohan v. Loucks, No. 12,323, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 99, at
*7 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1993) (approving settlement of derivative suit charging damages due to
Baxter International's criminal violations of the Israeli boycott regulations; demand on board
would probably be required and the decision of the board not to sue would probably be entitled
to protection under the business judgment rule).
245. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text (discussing special litigation committees).
246. SALOMON, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 14 (March 25, 1992); SALOMON, INC., 1991 ANNUAL
REPORT on Form 10-K 10.
247. See Lawrence J. Fox, The Special Litigation Committee Investigation: No Undertaking for
the Faint of Heart in SECION OF LITmATION, ABA, CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS: CON-
DUCTING THEM, PROTECTING THEM 202, 208 (1992) (stating that the committee must avoid de-
veloping a fine case against directors or officers with little or no assets, while establishing a
multi-million dollar liability for the corporation vis a vis class action plaintiffs); Michael P. Kenny
& William R. Mitchelson, Jr., Corporate Benefits of Properly Conducted Internal Investigations,
11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 679 (1995) (maximizing the corporation's ability to obtain a favorable
resolution while limiting potential liability).
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not respond in a suit by the company itself as opposed to a bona fide
derivative suit.248
B. The Securities Fraud Scandal at Cooper Companies, Inc.
The SEC recently issued a Report of Investigation into Cooper
Companies, Inc. (Cooper) which criticizes the actions of the Cooper
Board of Directors when faced with civil and criminal charges stem-
ming from securities law violations by the corporation and its co-
chairman of the board, Gary A. Singer.249 Cooper's common stock is
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Cooper consented to the
issuance of the SEC report without admitting or denying any of the
statements contained therein. The Commission stated:
The Commission is issuing this Report to emphasize that corporate
directors have a significant responsibility and play a critical role in
safeguarding the integrity of the company's public statements and
the interests of investors when evidence of fraudulent conduct by
corporate management comes to their attention. In this case,
Cooper's Board of Directors did not fulfill its obligations under the
federal securities laws when confronted with evidence of serious
wrongdoing by persons it continued to entrust with the day-to-day
management of the company and the making of public statements
on the company's behalf. That evidence called into question the
accuracy of Cooper's outstanding reports and made it incumbent on
the Board to ensure the candor and completeness of the company's
public statements to investors. 250
The following account is derived from the SEC report and has not
been independently verified other than, where indicated, by reference
to Cooper documents filed with the Commission. On January 15,
1992, the SEC issued an order directing an investigation into charges
of securities law violations by Cooper, Gary Singer and Steven Singer,
Gary's brother and a Cooper director as well as its chief administra-
tive officer and chief operating officer.251 On February 7, 1992, Gary
and Steven Singer asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and refused to testify before the Commission staff
into charges that: (1) Cooper and the Singer brothers participated in a
"frontrunning" scheme in the market for high yield bonds; and (2)
Gary Singer caused high yield bonds to be fraudulently traded be-
248. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 105, § 25-7 (noting that the purpose of the "insured
v. insured" exclusion is to prevent collusive litigation by the company against its officers and
directors).
249. Report of Investigation in In re Cooper Cos. As It Relates to the Conduct of Cooper's
Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 35,082, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 85,472 (Dec. 12, 1994) [hereinafter Report of Investigation].
250. Id. at 86,062.
251. Id. at 86,063.
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tween Cooper's account and accounts in the names of his wife and
aunt, to the detriment of Cooper.252 At the same time, the Commis-
sion investigated charges of a third scheme involving Gary Singer and
Cooper concerning the manipulation of the price of Cooper's deben-
tures to avoid an interest rate reset obligation imposed by the
debenture.253
On March 12, 1992, Cooper's counsel was informed that the U.S.
Attorney's Office in New York was conducting an investigation into
charges of market manipulation, and bribery of a mutual fund man-
ager and securities trader by key employees.254 The Cooper Board
promptly authorized an internal investigation by independent counsel,
but Gary and Steven Singer refused to be interviewed by the in-
dependent counsel.255 By April 9, the investigation had allegedly dis-
closed that in 1991, Gary Singer caused bond trades in excess of $6
million at below-market prices between Cooper and his wife and aunt,
depriving Cooper of profits of more than $560,000.256
On May 21, the Commission and the U.S. Attorney filed both civil
and criminal charges against Albert Griggs, a former analyst/assistant
portfolio manager with The Keystone Group, Inc., and John Collins,
the principal of Back Bay Capital, Inc., in connection with the Cooper
frontrunning scheme. 257 The Commission's complaint charged that
Griggs engaged in a fraudulent kickback scheme with an unnamed
senior Cooper officer in which Griggs gave that officer advance
knowledge of the high-yield bonds Griggs had recommended for
purchase by a group of mutual funds.258 The officer then allegedly
caused Cooper and related persons and entities to buy the bonds and
resell them to the funds at profits of nearly $3 million, in addition to
paying over $700,000 in Cooper corporate funds to Griggs and Collins
for "consulting services" through Back Bay Capital.259
At a May 21, 1992, plea hearing in the criminal proceeding, Griggs
publicly identified Gary Singer as the senior officer at Cooper with
whom he ran the frontrunning scheme.2 60 According to the Commis-
sion, Steven Singer then caused Cooper to issue a press release stat-
252. Id.
253. Id. at 86,062.
254. Id. at 86,063.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 86,062-63; SEC v. Griggs, Litigation Release No. 13,247, 1992 SEC LEXIS 1193
(May 21, 1992); COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 9 (June 30, 1992).
258. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,062; COOPER 1992 ANNUAL REPORT on
Form 10-K 12.
259. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,062.
260. Id. at 86,063.
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ing, "The Company denies any wrongdoing and is unaware of any
wrongdoing on the part of its officers or employees. ' 261 Griggs and
Collins consented to a permanent bar from association with any secur-
ities firm and agreed to cooperate in the SEC investigation.262 Collins
agreed to disgorge about $225,000 plus certain related tax refunds,
which was apparently all that remained of the alleged $700,000 pay-
ments by Cooper.263 Griggs and Collins also pleaded guilty in the re-
lated criminal proceedings. 264
On May 28, 1992, Cooper held a meeting of its board of directors at
which Gary Singer agreed to take a temporary, paid leave of ab-
sence.265 On May 26, Cooper's other co-chairman of the Board,
Bruce D. Sturman, commenced a derivative suit in New York
Supreme Court against Gary and Steven Singer, their brother Brad
Singer and father Martin Singer based on the alleged frontrunning
scheme with Griggs and Collins; the Cooper Board promptly sus-
pended Sturman with pay as co-chairman. 266 Cooper appointed a
search committee to find a new chief executive officer for the com-
pany.267 On May 27, 1992, a second shareholders' derivative suit was
filed against the company and its directors in Delaware Chancery
Court, once again based on the Keystone frontrunning scheme and
the board's alleged failure to investigate the charges. 268 Both actions
have been settled on undisclosed terms, subject to court approval.269
In April 1992, a proxy contest was initiated by Frederick Adler, a
partner in the law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski and a major Cooper
shareholder and former director who left the Board in October of
1991; this contest was settled on June 15, 1992.270 Under the terms of
the settlement, Adler and Louis Craco, a partner in the law firm of
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, agreed to be nominated to the Cooper
Board of Directors.271 Five sitting directors were not nominated for
261. Id. at 86,063-64.
262. SEC v. Griggs, Litigation Release No. 13,297, 1992 SEC LEXIS 1193, at *34 (May 21,
1992).
263. Id.
264. COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 9 (June 30, 1992).
265. Id. at 3.
266. Id. at 3, 10. The Sturman action was dismissed in August 1993 on the grounds of forum
non conveniens, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division in
March 1995. The suit was refiled in Delaware in June 1995. COOPER 1995 ANNUAL REPORT on
Form 10-K 44-45.
267. COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 3 (June 30, 1992).
268. COOPER, APRIL 30, 1992 QUARTERLY REPORT on Form 10-Q 15 (reporting the suit,
Lewis v. Singer, Civ. Action No. 12584).
269. COOPER 1995 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 44-45.




re-election: Gary, Steven, and Brad Singer, Bruce Sturman, and War-
ren Keegan, a Pace University Professor and business consultant.272
The nine nominees for the Cooper Board included Messrs. Adler and
Craco, four incumbent directors and three new appointees.2 73
On July 27, 1992, the SEC advised Cooper that it would recommend
enforcement action against the company and Gary and Steven
Singer.2 74 Gary Singer was then placed on an unpaid leave of absence,
but continued to receive benefits and payment of his legal fees.275 The
Board also terminated Bruce Sturman allegedly for cause, following
Sturman's initiation of a suit in California against Cooper on July 24
for anticipatory breach of his employment contract.2 76 The Board re-
elected Steven Singer as executive vice president and chief operating
officer of Cooper on July 28, 1992.277
Finally, on November 10, 1992, the SEC filed a civil action against
Cooper and Gary and Steven Singer, and indictments were returned
against Cooper and Gary Singer based upon the frontrunning
scheme.278 Cooper promptly retained the law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher as outside counsel for corporate governance advice.2 79
On November 16, acting on the advice of counsel at Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, the Cooper Board formed a management committee to
oversee the company's operations in the absence of a chief executive
officer and to provide guidance to Steven Singer, the chief operating
officer. 280
The civil action, initiated on November 10, named as defendants
Cooper and Gary and Steven Singer, Gary Singer's aunt, wife and two
alleged Singer family businesses. The SEC sought disgorgement of
profits from the frontrunning scheme and from the transactions in
which Cooper portfolio bonds were allegedly sold at below-market
prices to Singer family members.281
272. Id. at 4; COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 3 (February 27, 1991).
273. COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 4 (June 30, 1992).
274. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,064-65.
275. Id. at 86,064.
276. COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 8 (August 12, 1993); see Sturman v. Cooper Cos., No. C-93-
02227-VRW, 1993 WL 356893 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1993) (remanding the case to state court in the
absence of any federal question).
277. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,065.
278. Id.
279. Letter from John F. Olson, Esq., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher to Richard Wulf, Chief of the
Commission Division of Corporation Finance, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC WL 731843
(Dec. 19, 1994).
280. Id. at *4.
281. SEC v. Cooper Cos., Litigation Release No. 13,432, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2933 (Nov. 10,
1992).
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The November 10 action also charged that Cooper and Gary Singer
had illegally manipulated the trading price of Cooper's 10 5/8 percent
Convertible Subordinated Reset Debentures due 2005 to avoid a June
15, 1991, interest rate reset.282 Under the related indenture, if the
market price of the debentures on that date was not at least 75 percent
of face value, Cooper would adjust the interest rate to a level that
would cause the debentures to have such a market value.283 Accord-
ing to the complaint, on June 13 and 14, 1991, Gary Singer purchased
for Cooper's account 98 percent of all of the debentures traded on the
New York Stock Exchange, causing the price to rise to the required 75
percent of face value.2s4 The complaint further charged that Gary
Singer obtained fraudulent opinion letters from two little-known bro-
kerage firms purporting to establish that the interest rate of the de-
bentures was not required to be reset.285 The two alleged brokerage
firms, and the principals of each, were later charged with complicity in
the scheme.286
On January 13, 1994, Cooper and Gary Singer were both convicted
of fraud in the frontrunning scheme.287 The court ordered Cooper to
pay a criminal fine of $1.8 million, and restitution and interest of $1.3
million.288 In August 1995 Gary Singer was sentenced to twenty-eight
months in prison, $50,000 in fines, three years of supervised release
and 1,000 hours of community service. 28 9
In the related civil proceedings on December 12, 1994, Cooper con-
sented to entry of an injunction against further violations of the secur-
ities laws; in addition, Cooper agreed not to employ Gary or Steven
Singer or any relative of either, and to disgorgement of $1.6 million
and a civil penalty of $1.1 million, each net of the criminal fine and
282. Id. at *4.
283. Id.
284. Id. at *5.
285. Id.
286. SEC v. Russo, Litigation Release No. 13,632, 1993 LEXIS 1050 (May 11, 1993); SEC
Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-8573, Exchange Act Release No. 35,081, 1994 SEC LEXIS 3962
(Dec. 12, 1994). The SEC entered into a settlement agreement with one of the brokerage firms
which provided for censure, suspensions and fines without any admission or denial by the re-
spondent. Admin. Proceedings Against Lawrence Mascera and Mascera & Co., SEC News Re-
lease SEC 95-136, 1995 SEC WL 420707 (July 18, 1995).
287. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,065; see United States v. Singer, No. 92 Cr.
964 (RJW), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9773 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 1994) (denying new trial and motion
for judgment of acquittal).
288. SEC v. Cooper Cos., Litigation Release No. 14,351, 1994 SEC LEXIS 3963, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. December 12, 1994); see Federal Judge Orders Cooper Companies to Pay $3.1 Million
Penalty, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1994, at B6 (reporting criminal fine and restitution to Keystone
Funds).
289. See Ex-Cooper Official Given 28-Month Term In Junk-Bond Scheme, WALL ST. J., Aug.
10, 1995, at B10 (noting that the sentence imposed on Singer was harsher than he had expected).
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restitution. 290 Steven Singer agreed to settle the action on the basis of
a $200,000 civil penalty and over $2.5 million to be paid by him and
the other defendants. 291
The Commission concluded that the Board failed in its duties in two
respects: (1) after the Board learned that a member of senior manage-
ment concealed fraudulent self-dealing transactions, thereby causing
the company's outstanding reports to be inaccurate, the Board failed
to take immediate and effective action to protect the interest of the
company's investors; and (2) the Board's failure to act allowed a sec-
ond corporate officer, also allegedly involved in the fraudulent fron-
trunning scheme, to direct the issuance of a press release on behalf of
the company which falsely denied any knowledge of wrongdoing.2 92
1. The Fraudulent Self-Dealing Transactions
A majority of the Cooper Board was closely linked by family and
personal connections, which generally is not a sound practice for a
public company and a particularly unfortunate circumstance in this
case. The Board majority included Gary Singer, his brother Steven, a
third brother Brad, Steven Singer's father-in-law Joseph Feghali, and
Bruce Sturman, a high school friend and business ally of the Sing-
ers.293 The remaining directors were Michael Kalkstein, a lawyer;
Robert Weiss, Cooper's treasurer and chief financial officer; Warren
Keegan, a Pace University professor and business consultant; and Ar-
thur Bass, a former Cooper president and chief executive officer.294
Steven Singer was a lawyer,295 and the Singer family, together with the
Sturman family, had just taken control of Cooper and fought off two
proxy contests in 1988 and 1989.296 These same individuals were
named co-defendants in a fraud on the market suit arising out of activ-
ities subsequent to May 1988 when they joining Cooper.297
290. COOPER, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT on Form 10-K 44-45.
291. Civil Action Against the Cooper Companies et al., SEC News Digest 95-152, 1995 SEC
NEWS LEXIS 1757 (Aug. 8, 1995); Ex-Official of Cooper Settles SEC Charges of "Front-Run-
ning", WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1995, at B5 (outlining Steven Singer's civil penalty agreement).
292. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,065.
293. Terence P. Pare, All in the Families, FORTUNE, August 15, 1988, at 83.
294. COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 4-6 (June 30, 1992); COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 3 (Febru-
ary 27, 1991).
295. He was associated with Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison from 1985 to 1986, and
was deputy general counsel for Cooper from 1988 to 1989. COOPER PROXY STATEMENT 2 (Feb.
27, 1991).
296. See Kaufman v. Cooper Cos., 719 F. Supp. 174, 176-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (recounting the
history of the battle for control of Cooper).
297. Frank H. Cobb, Inc. v. Cooper Cos., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,576, at 92,667 (Mar. 20, 1992).
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While the SEC had ordered an investigation into charges of securi-
ties law violations, the existence of an investigation, particularly a civil
one, does not prove anything.2 98 The fact that both Singers allegedly
claimed their Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify before
the Commission, presumably on the advice of counsel, may well have
been consistent with the corporation's best interests since the com-
pany faced possible criminal charges.299
According to the SEC, when Cooper was informed of an investiga-
tion by the New York U.S. Attorney's Office on March 12, 1992, the
Board authorized an internal investigation by independent counsel.300
That action was quite appropriate. When the Singers allegedly re-
fused to be interviewed by the independent counsel, such refusal
would have been cause for concern if this is what happened. Ordina-
rily, a private employer is entitled to the cooperation of employees in
an internal investigation and may terminate an employee who refuses
to answer questions about the performance of his duties. 30 1
According to the SEC, Cooper's internal investigation disclosed
that Gary Singer had engaged in self-dealing transactions with mem-
bers of his family and family businesses by causing Cooper portfolio
bonds to be sold at less than market prices, thereby depriving Cooper
of profits totalling over $560,000.302 If improper self-dealing by an
298. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting criminal
charges under the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for company's failure to
disclose in its proxy statement that the defendant was the subject of a grand jury investigation
into alleged bribery of state officials); accord In re Browning-Ferris Indus., Shareholder Deriva-
tive Litig., 830 F. Supp. 361, 370 (S.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd sub nom., Cohen v. Ruckelshaus, 20 F.3d
465 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding no violation of proxy rules for failure to disclose that a board nomi-
nee had been the target of a grand jury investigation for federal antitrust violations to which the
corporation later pled guilty and paid a $1 million fine).
299. Seymour Glanzer et al., The Use of the Fifth Amendment in SEC Investigations, 41 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 895, 920 (1984) (claiming privilege may be best course of action), see generally
William R. McLucas et al., An Overview of Various Procedural Considerations Associated With
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Investigative Process, 45 Bus. LAw. 625 (1990) (dis-
cussing the "do's and don'ts" associated with SEC investigations); cf SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628
F,2d 1368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980) (holding that a corporation must respond to
an SEC investigative subpoena even though the evidence obtained may be used by the govern-
ment in contemplated parallel criminal proceedings).
300. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,063.
301. See Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & James A. Wright, Employee Refusals to Cooperate in Internal
Investigations: "Into the Woods" with Employers, Courts, and Labor Arbitrators, 56 Mo. L. REV.
869, 906-08 (1991) (asserting that employees must provide management with information); cf
TRW, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460,472 (Cal. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1102
(1995) (holding that employee of government contractor has no right to have counsel present or
remain silent in the face of an internal investigation and may be discharged for failure to cooper-
ate; the employee's Fifth Amendment rights are adequately protected by disallowing use of com-
pelled testimony in any subsequent criminal proceeding).
302. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,063.
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executive is discovered, such conduct presumably would be proper
cause for discharge. In this situation, Cooper had reason to act cau-
tiously, not necessarily because of Mr. Singer's employment contract,
but because Cooper itself faced serious criminal charges and Mr.
Singer was the only person with personal knowledge of the facts.30 3
2. The False Press Release
The SEC's second claim alleged that the Board, while in the posses-
sion of knowledge of improper self-dealing by the company's chief
executive officer, allowed the CEO's brother to issue a false press re-
lease denying any knowledge of wrongdoing.30 4 The fact that an exec-
utive may have engaged in wrongdoing does not constitute grounds
for discharging his brother, although a conflict of interest clearly arises
under such circumstances. Note that Steven Singer was not himself
indicted. The press release was issued when Griggs and Collins en-
tered guilty pleas, and they publicly identified Gary Singer as their
confederate in the frontrunning scheme; however, he was not identi-
fied as a participant in the alleged self-dealings, of which Cooper itself
was the only victim, although such transactions must be reported in
filings with the SEC and the stock exchange. 30 5
In any event, no systemic breakdown is apparent under the factual
circumstances described above. The Cooper Board has since been
completely replaced, together with its management team, and corpo-
rate governance changes have been made with the advice of in-
dependent outside counsel. The SEC Division of Corporation
Finance noted these factors in finding good cause to grant Cooper re-
lief from the disqualifying provisions which would otherwise, based
upon the criminal convictions, bar the company from using exemp-
tions from registration under the Securities Act of 1933.306 If the
Cooper Board in fact acted inappropriately, any wrongdoing will pre-
sumably be dealt with in the pending derivative suits.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Principles of Corporate Governance has a vision of the corporate
world that is a vision of uniform compliance with law, although al-
303. See In re E.F. Hutton Banking Practices Litig., 634 F. Supp. 265, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(stating that an independent board, faced with wrongdoing by individual officers and directors
which threatens the viability of the company, may well wish to defer litigation against such
individuals).
304. Report of Investigation, supra note 249, at 86,065.
305. Id. at 86,063-64.
306. See Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, supra note 279 (granting application for relief
pursuant to Rule 505(b)(2)(iii) of Regulation D).
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lowances are made for instances where laws are unenforced, ambigu-
ous or invalid, or rightly regarded as a cost of doing business. This is
not a vision of the real world, where the norm of general compliance
with law is an aspirational one rather than a realistic one. 30 7 The
United States is a nation with a superabundance of laws: laws that
have been forgotten, laws that are rarely or selectively enforced, laws
that no one understands, and laws that are regarded by everyone as
more of a nuisance than a moral command. 30 8 We are constantly re-
minded of this state of affairs when our moral, political, business, pro-
fessional, religious, educational, judicial and other leaders are found
to have the same weaknesses as society at large with respect to income
tax compliance, use of controlled substances, employment of undocu-
mented aliens or unconventional sexual preferences. The situation is
exacerbated by the contention of law enforcement personnel that
criminal conviction should not require proof of intent to violate the
law, a very problematic notion that greatly confuses the moral and
legal issues. 309
307. See Michael Siconolfi, Wall Street Gurus Are Hitting the Books Again, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 1995, at C1 (noting a dirty little secret on Wall Street, namely that many brokerage employ-
ees who are required to have a broker's license don't have them).
308. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet found anyone in violation of the court-
created laws against insider trading. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (af-
firming conviction of Wall Street Journal employee by an equally divided court); Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983) (reversing censure of broker); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
(reversing conviction of a financial document printing employee). A stock broker was convicted
and imprisoned for violating insider trading laws by trading on inside information of a tender
offer by A & P for Waldbaum, Inc. in United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). It was probably small consolation to him that he could
have kept the money if it had been inside information about a merger instead of a tender offer,
since breach of fiduciary duty is required to violate Section 10(b), but not Section 14(e), of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 765-66 (W.D. Okla.
1984) (holding that University of Oklahoma football coach did not violate law by trading on
inside information of bank merger overheard by him at a track meet); see also United States v.
Rebrook, 58 F.3d 961, 965-66 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995) (reversing conviction
of lawyer for securities fraud but affirming conviction for wire fraud); United States v. Bryan, 58
F.3d 933, 952 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting misappropriation theory of insider trading). The Govern-
nient prudently decided not to seek Supreme Court review of the question in Bryan. Milo Geye-
lin, Insider Ruling Will Stand, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1995, at B5.
309. In some recent cases, the Supreme Court has applied a presumption, as a matter of
statutory construction, that actual knowledge of prohibited conduct is required for criminal con-
viction. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1994) (interpreting the National
Firearms Act to require proof of actual knowledge that weapon meets statutory definition of a
machine gun); Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 663 (1994) (interpreting a "willful viola-
tion" of the Bank Secrecy Act to require actual knowledge that structuring the transaction to
evade the reporting requirement was unlawful); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S.
Ct. 464, 472 (1994) (interpreting a "knowing" violation of the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act to require proof of actual knowledge that actress is a minor and the
material is sexually explicit); Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1754
(1994) (interpreting the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act to require proof of the use
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While corporate directors should certainly not be able to break the
law with impunity, lawbreaking is not a uniquely corporate law con-
cern. If directors break the law, they should be, and are, subject to the
same criminal, civil and administrative penalties as any other individ-
ual, business person or not. If they cause damage to the corporation
in the process, they should be held accountable for their actions, sub-
ject to the authority of other disinterested directors to decide whether
or not to file suit. The idea that directors are routinely hiding behind
permissive standards for director conduct and lenient provisions for
director indemnification and insurance is not supported by the facts.
With respect to the suggestion that the derivative shareholder attor-
ney's hand should be strengthened by abolishing the "net loss" rule
and weakening the power of disinterested directors to control deriva-
tive litigation, the wisdom of relying upon professional plaintiff's
counsel under present conditions has been more than adequately
questioned elsewhere.310 In a recent case, a hastily considered diversi-
fication program by Pacific Enterprises caused over $750 million in
losses to the corporation. 311 A leading plaintiff's law firm brought a
derivative action in California state court on behalf of the corporation
against the directors, and simultaneously brought a "fraud on the mar-
ket" class action in federal court against the corporation on behalf of
the company's common stockholders. 312 The state court action was
of interstate commerce to sell items which the defendant knew were likely to be used with illegal
drugs); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1991) (interpreting a "willful" violation of
the Internal Revenue Code to require proof of actual intent to evade income tax laws).
310. In BZT, Inc. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 47 F.3d 463 (1st Cir. 1995), the court disallowed
any attorneys' fees for plaintiff's counsel for what it viewed as "phantom legal services" in a
shareholders' derivative suit against directors which challenged their opposition to a hostile
takeover. Id. at 466. Although the directors ultimately agreed to the takeover, and the acquir-
ing corporation agreed not to object to fees for plaintiff's counsel of up to $2 million, the court
found that the plaintiff's attorneys had not contributed to the ultimate success of the takeover.
Id.; see generally John C. Coffee, Jr. Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory For Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677 (1986) (concluding that such actions "are uniquely vulnerable to collu-
sive settlements that benefit plaintiff's attorneys rather than their clients"); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1991) (proposing
changes to compensate for the fact that plaintiff's counsel is not accountable to his "client").
311. In re Pacific Enter. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1995).
312. Id. at 378. The court stated that it was "concerned about the potential conflicts created
by the linked settlement and by ... dual representation of derivative and securities plaintiffs."
Id. However, the court did not rule on the issue because no objection had been made in the trial
court. Plaintiff's counsel indicated that no conflict arose and stated that representation by one
firm in both cases had "tremendous advantages" in terms of coordination. Jill Abramson &
Amy Stevens, Class-Action Clash: King of "Strike Suits" Finds Style Cramped by Legal-Over-
haul Bill, WALL ST. J., March 30, 1995, at Al, A6.
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refiled in federal court, and both suits were settled simultaneously.313
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the corporation paid
$21 million and its officers' and directors' insurers paid $12 million to
settle the securities suit and the insurers and the company's auditors
paid $12 million to the corporation to settle the derivative suit. Plain-
tiff's counsel requested $8 million of the latter $12 million but re-
ceived $4 million.314 As the court noted, the corporation arguably
received no financial benefit from the settlement because all of the
money went to the securities plaintiffs, 315 despite the fact that both
suits were of doubtful merit.316
The tonic for poor corporate governance practices prescribed in re-
cent decades has been the presence of independent directors on the
corporation's board.317 Institutional investors, who have become a
powerful force in corporate governance, have endorsed the concept of
having a majority of independent directors on the board, a recommen-
dation contained in the recently adopted GM Guidelines. 318 The defi-
nition of "independent director" endorsed by the National
Association of Corporate Directors excludes: (1) any employee or for-
mer employee or relative of an employee; (2) service providers to the
313. In re Pacific Enters., 47 F.3d at 375.
314. Id. at 375-76.
315. Id. at 378.
316. See id. ("[T]he odds of winning the derivative lawsuit were extremely small."); id. at 375
(noting a statement by the federal trial judge in the securities case that "many defendants were
'probably going to win' on summary judgment"); see also Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 62-63
(Del. 1991) (affirming a settlement agreement in a derivative action in which plaintiff's counsel
received legal fees of $800,000 despite a benefit to the corporation which the Court of Chancery
described as "meager," and despite the trial court's view that plaintiff's "potential for ultimate
success on the merits [was] realistically, very poor").
317. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Un-
derstanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 673-675 (1992)
(analyzing the disinterested director requirement). On November 30, 1995, Delaware Supreme
Court Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey declared, "[h]aving a majority of independent directors
makes a big difference." Shelene Clark, Independent Board that Can "Just Say No" to Manage-
ment Makes "A Big Difference" if Corporation Ends Up in Court, BNA CoRP. COUNSEL
WEEKLY, December 6, 1995, at 8.
318. See GM Board Guidelines On Significant Corporate Governance Issues, Guideline 15,
"Mix of Inside And Outside Directors" ("The Board believes that as a matter of policy there
should be a majority of independent Directors on the GM Board."); see also A Message From
Our Chairman, in GENERAL MOTORS 1993 ANNUAL REPORT (1994) (noting that the GM Guide-
lines embrace the idea of lead directors, and that the concept of outside directors' meetings has
received praise from investor representatives). In a letter dated May 12, 1994, CALPERS (the
$80 billion California Public Employees' Retirement System) sent a copy of the GM guidelines
to the largest corporations in America; according to CALPERS, more than half of the 300 com-
panies surveyed submitted responses rated by CALPERS as good to exceptional. CALPERS
Pleased with Final Results of Year-Long Survey on Governance, BNA CORP. COUNSEL WEEKLY,
June 7, 1995, at 2.
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corporation or employees of major service providers; and (3) anyone
who receives corporate compensation other than director fees.319
It is generally agreed that the example set by top corporate manag-
ers is key in setting the tone for corporate compliance with the law.32 0
The 1992 report of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission on internal control stresses that, more than any
other individual, the chief executive officer sets the tone for integrity
and ethics in the corporation. 321 The presence of independent direc-
tors on the board and their support for corporate compliance with law
reinforces the determination of corporate management not to tolerate
lawbreaking.
319. REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS, BOARDS, AND DIRECTORS 34 (1994). Strengthening the independ-
ent review of internal controls at insured depository institutions was a major goal of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which requires independent directors
on the audit committee. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(g)(1) (1994); Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Anti-
dote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317
(1993). The SEC has announced its support for the Investment Company Act Amendments of
1995, H.R. 1495, which among other things would increase the statutory requirement of in-
dependent directors on the boards of regulated investment companies from forty percent to a
majority. Barbash Details SEC's Stand on Proposed Investment Company Act Overhaul, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1692, at 1697 (Dec. 13, 1995).
320. RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING 29 (1994).
321. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 1, 4 (1992); see
generally Catherine Collins McCoy & John A. Galotto, The COSO Report on Internal Control:
Implications for Public Companies and Executives, 7 INSIGHTS No. 8, at 29 (Aug. 1993).
